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L Introduction
Therapeutic jurisprudence is a new approach to legal policy
analysis that calls for the study of law's inevitable impact on the
physical and mental health of the individuals and institutions it
affects.' Like legal realism,2 to which it owes a significant
intellectual debt, it is empirical and interdisciplinary in character.3
Once it is recognized that legal rules and procedures will have
therapeutic consequences, the law can be viewed as a therapeutic
1 See THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW As A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David
B. Wexler ed., 1990) [hereinafter LAW As AGENT]; ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991) [hereinafter ESSAYS];
David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, The Potential of herapeutic Jurisprudence:A New
Approach to Psychology and Law, in LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY: THE BROADENING OF
THE DISCIPLINE (James R. P. Olgoff ed., 1992) [hereinafter Wexler & Winick, The
Potential of Therapeutic Jurisprudence]; David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New Approach to Mental Health Policy Analysis and
Research, 45 MIAMI L. REV. 979 (1991) [hereinafter Wexler & Winick, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence as a New Approach]. See also Michael L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic
Jurisprudence?, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623, 625 (1993) (this issue) (describing
therapeutic jurisprudence generally).
2 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931). See generally WILLIAM L. TWINING, KARL
LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973).
3 David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Introduction to ESSAYS, supra note 1, at x-
xi, xiu-xiv; David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New
Research Tool, in ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 303, 307-08 [hereinafter Wexler & Winick,
New Research Tool]; Wexler & Winick, The Potential of Therapeutic Jurisprudence,
supra note 1, at 211-12, 328-39.
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agent. Whether those consequences further or frustrate individual
and social health thus emerges as a question worth asking and
attempting to answer. We should know how the law functions in this
regard. In designing and redesigning legal rules, consideration
should be given to a variety of relevant consequences. Just as the
law's impact on economic behavior or the quality of the environment
should be assessed, its consequences for individual and social health
deserve consideration.
Therapeutic jurisprudence accordingly calls for a systematic
assessment of the impact of legal rules, procedures, and the roles of
legal actors on therapeutic values. It provides a new research agenda
for social scientists interested in legal studies and a new tool with
which legal policy analysis can be improved by considering the fruits
of empirical research into and theoretical speculation about the
operation of law.4 The result can be law that functions more
effectively and in greater harmony with the goal of enhancing
individual and social health.
In three cases decided during its 1991 term, the United States
Supreme Court considered a number of significant mental health law
issues. These cases seem to reflect a new direction for the Court in
mental health law. All three cases announce legal rules that will have
significant impact on therapeutic values. Although the Court's
opinions in these cases did not consider the therapeutic consequences
of these rules, an analysis of the likely consequences seems to
provide strong support for the new mental health jurisprudence they
reflect. Each of the three cases presents an opportunity to
demonstrate the power and utility of the therapeutic jurisprudence
lens.
In Riggins v. Nevada,' the Court held that a criminal
defendant's due process rights were violated when he was forced to
stand trial on a high dose of antipsychotic medication that interfered
with his ability to present the insanity defense he raised. In Foucha
v. Louisiana,6 the Court held that due process was violated when state
4 Wexler & Winick, New Research Tool, supra note 3, at 303-05.
S 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992).
6 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992). See Bruce J. Winick, Reconceptualizing Mental Health
Law in Light of Foucha v. Louisiana, (Jan. 28, 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author).
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law authorized continued confinement in a mental hospital of an
insanity acquittee who was considered to be still dangerous, although
he had recovered from mental illness. In Medina v. California,7 the
Court rejected a due process challenge to a state statutory
presumption in favor of competency that required a criminal
defendant to bear the burden of proving his own incompetency to
stand trial.
Each case turned on construction of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's approach in all three was
interesting and has broad implications for the future of mental health
law. The issues dealt with-the right to refuse involuntary mental
health treatment, the constitutional limits on the power of the states
to commit individuals to mental hospitals, and the procedural
requirements for assessing competency-are central to mental health
law. In all three cases, the Court's approach was broader than the
facts of the case required. In all three, the Court moved in a new
direction, seeming to step away from previous pronouncements. In
two of the cases, Riggins and Foucha, the Court broadened the
constitutional rights of mental patients, something it had seemed
disinclined to do in recent years. In the third, Medina, although the
Court rejected the individual's constitutional claim, its decision
vindicated the presumption of competency, which it had seemed to
question two years earlier in Zinermon v. Burch.8 The Court's
endorsement of the presumption in favor of competency coupled with
its reinvigoration of the right to refuse treatment and extension of
substantive due process limits on involuntary hospitalization, suggest
a new and important direction for the Court in mental health law, one
that has broad implications for a number of unresolved mental health
law issues.
This Article conducts a therapeutic jurisprudence analysis of
the Riggins case, assessing its implications for the incompetency-to-
7 112 S. Ct. 2752 (1992). See BruceJ. Winick, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof
in Determining Competency to Stand Trial. An Analysis of Medina v. California and the
Supreme Court's New Due Process Methodology in Criminal Cases, 47 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 817 (1993).
' 494 U.S. 113 (1990). See Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Voluntary
Hospitalization: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis of Zinermon v. Burch, 14 INT'L
J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 169 (1991).
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stand-trial process and for the right to refuse mental health treatment
generally. The incompetency issue arises frequently, affecting
virtually all criminal defendants exhibiting symptoms of mental illness
during the pretrial phase of the proceedings. Many of these
defendants undergo treatment with psychotropic drugs and their
treatment and the ability of the state to try them while on medication
will be vitally affected by the Court's decision in Riggins. Moreover,
the Court's surprising treatment of the right to refuse medication
issue will affect not only these defendants, but also an increasing
number of civil mental patients, in hospital and community settings,
who assert a right to refuse unwanted medication.
The Article analyses the constitutional and therapeutic
implications of Riggins. Part II examines the opinion for the majority
written by Justice O'Connor and the provocative concurring opinion
of Justice Kennedy, which proposes an approach to these issues that
goes considerably beyond that suggested by the majority. Part III
next examines the impact of the suggestions made by both the
majority and Justice Kennedy on the incompetency process. Many
open questions are left unresolved by both opinions. These
unresolved issues will have enormous implications for criminal
defendants restored to competency through the use of psychotropic
medication who require on-going medication but wish to discontinue
it during trial. This part seeks to clarify these issues, many of which
are not addressed in Riggins, and to suggest how they should be
resolved in light of constitutional and therapeutic considerations.
Riggins held that due process was violated when the defendant
was forced to stand trial while on antipsychotic medication which
negatively affected his demeanor and probably his ability to
participate in the proceedings. Although the Court's holding is
narrow, turning on the absence of sufficient findings by the trial court
to justify continuing medication over the defendant's objection, it
contains important dicta that suggests the standards courts will apply
in future cases involving the right to refuse treatment in the criminal
trial context. After examining the implications of the Court's
suggested standard and those of Justice Kennedy, part III identifies
and analyzes a number of unresolved issues that the Court's decision
raises, including the disposition of defendants permitted to discontinue
medication who become incompetent as a result, and of those
required to continue medication, but for whom the side effects impair
1993] 641
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their demeanor at trial or their ability to participate in the
proceedings. It also discusses the question of whether a competent
defendant may waive his right to be tried while competent in advance
and elect to stand trial in an unmedicated and possibly impaired state.
Part IV analyzes the impact of Riggins on the right to refuse
treatment in other contexts. Involuntary mental health treatment
provided in mental hospitals, prisons, jails, and increasingly in the
community as a condition for release or diversion from these
institutions, has produced an expanding body of case law and
commentary concerning the right to refuse treatment, 9 particularly its
significant decision in Washington v. Harper."° It then analyzes the
extent to which the standards suggested in Riggins differ from the
Court's earlier approach to the right to refuse treatment. This part
then discusses the implications of Riggins for assertions of the right
to refuse treatment in other contexts, including civil mental hospitals
and community settings. Finally, part IV analyzes the im"'pact of
recognizing a more generous right to refuse treatment on therapeutic
values, concluding that a broad right to refuse treatment, by allowing
greater patient choice in treatment decisionmaking and effectuating a
restructuring of the therapist-patient relationship, may increase the
potential for mental health treatment to be successful. Although
justified by the Court on constitutional grounds, Riggins' broadening
of the right to refuse treatment thus also may be defended based on
considerations of therapeutic jurisprudence."1
9 See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, The Right to Refuse Treatment with Antipsychotic
Medications: Retrospect and Prospect, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 413, 413-14 (1988);
Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutional Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medications, 8
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 179 (1980); Bruce J. Winick, Legal Limitations
on Correctional Therapy and Research, 65 MINN. L. REv. 331 (1981) [hereinafter
Winick, Legal Limitations]; Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Psychotropic
Medication: Current State of the Law and Beyond, in THE RIGHT To REFUSE
ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION 7 (David Rappoport & John Parry eds., 1986) [hereinafter
Winick, Right to Refuse].
'0 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
" See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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II. Riggins v. Nevada
While awaiting trial in a Nevada jail on murder and robbery
charges, David Riggins complained to a prison psychiatrist about
hearing voices and having trouble sleeping." After Riggins told the
psychiatrist that he had been successfully treated with the
antipsychotic drug Mellaril" in the past, the psychiatrist prescribed
100 mg of the drug per day. 4 Because Riggins continued to
complain about his symptoms, the psychiatrist gradually increased
Riggins' dosage to 800 mg per day. 5 During his incarceration,
Riggins moved for a determination of his competency to stand trial. 16
The court appointed three psychiatrists to evaluate him.17 Two of the
psychiatrists concluded that Riggins was competent to stand trial,"8
while the third found him to be incompetent.19 The trial court
determined that Riggins was competent.20
Several months before his trial was to begin, Riggins moved
for the termination of his medication until the end of trial. 2' Riggins
contended that continued medication would infringe his
constitutionally protected freedom, deny him due process because of
the adverse effect the drugs would have on his demeanor and mental
12 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812. Riggins had been arrested for the murder of Paul
Wade, who was found dead in his own Las Vegas apartment. Id. Mr. Wade died from
multiple stab wounds to his head, chest, and back. Id. While awaiting trial, Riggins
was treated by Dr. Edward Quass, a private psychiatrist who treated patients in the Clark
County Jail. Id.
" See Bruce J. Winick, Psychotropic Medication and Competence to Stand Trial,
1977 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 769, 778-89 (1977) (describing the history, functioning,
and side effects of antipsychotic drugs and other types of medication used to treat
defendants found incompetent to stand trial).
14 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812.
t5 Id. Riggins was also prescribed Dilantin, an antiepileptic drug. Id.
16 Id.
" Id. The examinations took place during March and April of 1988 while Riggins
was taking 450 mg of Mellaril per day. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812.
s Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812. The two psychiatrists reaching this conclusion were
Dr. William O'Gorman, who had previously treated Riggins for anxiety in 1982, and
Dr. Franklin Master. Id.
19 Id. This was the finding of Dr. Jack Jurasky. Id.
2 Id.
21 Id.
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state during trial, and violate his right to show the jury his "true
mental state" as part of the insanity defense he planned to raise.22
The prosecution opposed the motion, arguing that the court could
require medication necessary to maintain the defendant's competency
to stand trial.23 At an evidentiary hearing on Riggins' motion, two
psychiatrists testified that discontinuation of the drugs would not
render the defendant incompetent. A third psychiatrist, while
questioning the need to give Riggins the high dose of Mellaril he was
receiving, was unable to predict how Riggins might behave if taken
off the drug.25 A fourth psychiatrist, who did not testify, submitted
a written report reiterating his earlier view that Riggins was
incompetent and predicting that, if taken off drugs, he would "regress
to a manifest psychosis" and become "extremely difficult to
manage."26  In a brief order that gave no reasons for the court's
decision, the trial court denied Riggins' motion to terminate the
medication.27 As a result, Riggins continued to receive 800 mg of
Mellaril each day through the completion of his trial some four
months later.28
At trial, Riggins testified on his own behalf in support of his
insanity defense.29 The jury found him guilty and returned a death
sentence after a separate penalty hearing.3" Riggins appealed to the
Nevada Supreme Court, asserting that the forced medication had
interfered with his ability to assist in his defense and prejudicially
2 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812.
'3 Id. at 1812-13.
24 Id. at 1813. Dr. Master "guess[ed]" that the suspension of Riggins' medication
would not significantly alter Riggins' behavior or render him incompetent for trial. Dr.
Quass shared this opinion and added that even if medication were to continue, its effects
would not be noticeable to the jury. Id.
' Id. This was the conclusion of Dr. O'Gorman, who testified that Mellaril would
not only calm and relax the defendant, but also cause extreme drowsiness if excessive
doses were administered. Id.
' Id. The report was submitted by Dr. Jurasky. Id.
27 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1813.
SId.
2 Id. Riggins testified that he had used cocaine before going to Wade's apartment,
had gotten into a fight with Wade while under the impression that Wade was trying to
kill him, and had heard voices in his head which told him that killing Wade would
constitute justifiable homicide. Id.
0 Id.
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affected his attitude, appearance, and demeanor at trial.31 The court
affirmed Riggins' conviction, holding that the denial of Riggins's
motion to terminate medication was not an abuse of discretion based
on the finding that expert testimony presented at trial was sufficient
to inform the jury of the effects of the medication on Riggins'
demeanor and testimony.32 A concurring opinion suggested that the
trial court should have determined whether administration of the drug
during trial was "absolutely necessary" by attempting a pretrial
suspension of medication." A dissent argued that forced
antipsychotic medication should never be permitted solely to allow a
defendant to be prosecuted.34
The United States Supreme Court reversed, finding that the
trial court had failed to make findings sufficient to justify the forced
administration of medication to Riggins." In an opinion on behalf of
six members of the Court, Justice O'Connor distinguished Riggins
from Washington v. Harper,36 in which the Court rejected a state
prisoner's claim that the forced administration of antipsychotic
medication violated his due process right to refuse such treatment.37
Although agreeing that involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medication represented a "substantial interference with that person's
liberty,"3 the Court in Harper upheld the involuntary use of
medication in the prison context, where a prison review board had
determined that the prisoner was "dangerous to himself or others"
and that the treatment was in the prisoner's own "medical interest."39
The Court in Riggins, without questioning the medical
appropriateness of administering Mellarail, an issue never challenged
3' Id. at 1813. Riggins asserted that the resulting prejudice was not justified because
the State did not demonstrate the need to administer Mellaril nor explore less intrusive
alternative methods of treatment. Id.
32 Riggins v. State, 808 P.2d 535, 538 (Nev. 1991).
I d. at 540 (Rose, J., concurring).
3' Id. at 541-43 (Springer, J., dissenting).
" Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1817.
36 494 U.S. 210 (1990). See infra text accompanying notes 211-44 (discussing the
case in greater detail).
37 Riggins, 112 U.S. at 1814-15.
3 Harper, 494 U.S. at 229.
39 Id. at 227.
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by defense counsel, 4° nevertheless found that the State had failed to
justify the "need" for such medication.41 The Court purported to
apply the Harper standard for considering the constitutionality of
involuntary antispsychotic medication, but in fact reformulated it.42
Justice O'Connor's opinion restated the Harper standard as requiring,
as a condition for forced medication, that the state show both an
overriding justification and medical appropriateness. 4.
The Court identified two potential justifications for forced
administration of antipsychotic medication in the trial or pretrial
context, but found that the records in the case failed to support the
presence of either." First, the Court noted that the State "certainly"
would have satisfied due process "if the prosecution had demonstrated
and the District Court had found" that involuntary medication was
"medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives,
essential for the sake of Riggins' own safety or the safety of
others. ,45 Second, the Court noted that the State "might have been
able to justify medically appropriate, involuntary treatment with the
drug by establishing that it could not obtain an adjudication of
Riggins' guilt or innocence by using less intrusive means. "4
Neither justification was present in the case before it, the
Court found, because the trial court had allowed continued medication
over objection "without making any determination of the need for this
course or any findings about reasonable alternatives. "4' Although the
prosecution had argued at the trial court that continued medication
was necessary to ensure that Riggins could be tried, 48 the Court noted
that the trial court's one-page order denying the defendant's motion
had failed to make any findings that "safety considerations or other
compelling concerns outweighed" the defendant's constitutional
4o Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814.
4' Id. at 1817.
42 Id. at 1815.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 1815-16.
41 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
6Id.
4' Id. at 1815-16.
4s Id. at 1812-13, 1816.
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interest to be free of forced medication.49 The Court emphasized the
absence of any findings that Riggins would become incompetent
without medication.5" In fact, as the Court noted, the psychiatric
testimony given at the motion hearing "casts considerable doubt" on
that conclusion.5" The Supreme Court's review of the hearing
transcript led it to conclude that at most, the trial court merely
balanced the potential prejudicial effect the drugs might have on
Riggins at trial against the possibility that he would become
incompetent if the drugs were discontinued.52 In the Court's opinion,
this balancing approach insufficiently accounted for the defendant's
liberty interest in freedom from forced medication.53
Moreover, the Court found that evidence presented at the
hearing held on Riggins' motion supported his assertion that
continuing the medication during trial had interfered with the fairness
of the proceedings. 54 The Court acknowledged the existence of a
"substantial probability of trial prejudice" resulting from the side
effects of the drug, which may have affected the defendant's outward
appearance and "the content of his testimony," his ability to follow
the proceedings, and "the substance of his communications with
counsel. "" The Court rejected a suggestion contained in Justice
Thomas' dissenting opinion which would have required a showing of
actual prejudice as a condition for reversal of Riggins' conviction
because of the inherent difficulties in proving such prejudice in this
situation and the speculative nature of an inquiry into whether the
outcome of the trial would have been different had Riggins' motion
been granted.56 As in other cases where the precise consequences of
an error cannot be demonstrated from the record,57 and in which
4' Id. at 1816.
50 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
4 Id.
" Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816.
Id. (Justice Thomas would have required Riggins to demonstrate how the trial
would have proceeded differently had he not been medicated).
' Id. (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05 (1976) (consequences of
compelling defendant to wear prison clothing at trial) and Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337
(1970) (consequences of binding and gagging an accused at trial)).
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prejudice is therefore presumed, the Court was willing to accept the
"strong possibility that Riggins was impaired" during trial due to the
medication as the basis for reversal.5"
The majority found Justice Thomas' argument that potential
prejudice could be overcome by the presentation of expert testimony
explaining Mellaril's negative effects on the defendant's demeanor to
the jury equally unpersuasive. 59  At most, expert testimony might
allow the jury to fairly assess the defendant's demeanor. However,
because the potential prejudice included the chance that medication
had affected the substance of Riggins' testimony, his interaction with
counsel, and his ability to comprehend the proceedings, the Court
found "an unacceptable risk of prejudice remained. "'
In a concurring opinion that displayed even more concern
about the potential for prejudice created by the medication
administered, Justice Kennedy concluded that the involuntary
administration of antipsychotic drugs "poses a serious threat to a
defendant's right to fair trial. "6 Going beyond the majority, Justice
Kennedy expressed the view that "absent an extraordinary showing"
by the state, due process prohibits the prosecution from administering
involuntary antipsychotic medicines "for purposes of rendering the
accused competent. "62 Furthermore, Justice Kennedy expressed doubt
that this extraordinary showing could ever be made in light of our
limited understanding of the drugs and their effects.63
Justice Kennedy's opinion contains a detailed analysis of the
potential adverse side effects of the antipsychotic drugs.' He
Id.
I d. In a dissent joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas argued that the Nevada
Supreme Court's analysis comported with state court decisions which have also held that
expert testimony may suffice to clarify the effect of psychotropic medication on a
defendant's demeanor. Accordingly, Justice Thomas concluded that Riggins' inability
to introduce evidence of his mental condition as he desired did not render his trial
fundamentally unfair. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1822 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
60 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816.
61 Id. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Q Id.
6 Id.
"Id. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (including potential adverse side effects of
restlessness, diminished range of facial expression, slowed movements and slurred
speech amongst others).
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documented how these effects can prejudice the defendant at trial by
altering his demeanor in ways that can impair his reactions and
presentation in court.65 These effects may modify the defendant's
behavior, manner, facial expressions, and emotional responses.' In
some cases, these modifications can prejudice the jury's over-all
impression of the defendant, a consequence which, Justice Kennedy
noted, can have a powerful influence on the outcome of the trial.67
These side effects can also impair the defendant's ability or
willingness to assist or communicate with counsel and to participate
in his own defense.68 Indeed, in view of the potential effects of the
drugs on the defendant's demeanor and ability to testify, Justice
Kennedy likened allowing the prosecution to compel medication of
the defendant during the pretrial and trial phases of the case to
permitting the prosecutor to manipulate material evidence.69 Because
of the serious effects of imposing unwanted antipsychotic medication
during trial, Justice Kennedy proposed that a state be required to
demonstrate the absence of any "significant risk that the medication
will impair or alter in any material way the defendant's capacity or
willingness to react to the testimony at trial or to assist his counsel"
in order to justify such forced medication.7' Without this
"extraordinary showing," Justice Kennedy would prohibit involuntary
administration of antipsychotic medication even for the purpose of
rendering the defendant competent to stand trial.71
By insisting on the additional requirement of an
"extraordinary showing," Justice Kennedy's concurrence went
considerably further than the majority's suggestion that "the State
might justify medically appropriate, involuntary treatment" as
Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1818-20.
SId.
67 Id. at 1818-19.
Id. at 1819-20.
I d. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
87 (1963) (suppression by the prosecution of material evidence favorable to the accused
violates due process) and Arizona v. Youngblood, 499 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (failure to
preserve potentially useful evidence violates due process)).
7 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1818, 1819 (stating that medication should be "unacceptable
absent a showing by the State that the side effects will not alter the defendant's reactions
or diminish his capacity to assist counsel.").
71 Id. at 1817.
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necessary to permit an adjudication of the charges.72 As Justice
Kennedy indicated, this additional requirement may be exceedingly
difficult for the state to satisfy.73 Indeed, given the difficulties of the
state's making this "extraordinary showing," Justice Kennedy's
opinion in effect stops just short of prohibiting involuntary
antipsychotic medication during trial even if necessary to maintain a
defendant's competency to stand trial.
Moreover, Justice Kennedy's opinion suggested that a
defendant wishing to stand trial without medication, despite the fact
that termination will result in a reversion to incompetency, would not
be able to do so consistent with due process even if the defendant is
willing to waive his objection to being tried while incompetent before
the termination of medication.74 Permitting such waiver, in Justice
Kennedy's view, would violate the Court's "holding in Pate v.
Robinson . . .that conviction of an incompetent defendant violates
due process. "75 Thus, under Justice Kennedy's approach, unless the
state could make the extremely difficult showing that medication
would not alter the defendant's demeanor or hamper his ability to
participate in the proceedings, involuntary medication could not be
used in the pretrial or trial context. In such cases, unless a defendant
raises no objection to medication, Justice Kennedy would hold that
the defendant could not be tried, at least not until his condition
improved either through the use of other forms of treatment or by the
passage of time.76
7 Id. at 1815.
1 Id. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
7 Id. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., concurring). For criticism of this suggestion, see infra
part III.E.
7s Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1817. (citations omitted).
76 See id. at 1820 ("If the defendant cannot be tried without his behavior and
demeanor being affected in this substantial way by involuntary treatment, in my view the
Constitution requires that society bear the cost in order to preserve the integrity of the
trial process.").
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III. The Implications of Rigginsfor the Trio) of Defendants
Needing Psychotropic Medication
Riggins leaves open an entire series of issues concerning how
courts should deal with defendants needing continued psychotropic
medication. Justice Kennedy, whose concurring opinion addressed
more of these issues than did the majority's decision, did not, of
course, speak for the Court. Moreover, the majority's suggestion
that involuntary medication might be justified by the need to maintain
a defendant's competency so that he may stand trial does not
constitute a definitive pronouncement on the matter.' The holding
of the case is actually quite narrow: the trial court's failure to make
any determination regarding the need for involuntary medication or
any findings with respect to reasonable alternatives rendered its
continuation of such medication over the defendant's objection
unconstitutional.7" Thus, the majority's suggestions with respect to
possible justifications for involuntary medication in this context are
dicta, and tentative dicta at that. In contrast to its more affirmative
statement that the State "certainly would have satisfied due process"
if it had demonstrated that involuntary medication was "medically
appropriate and ... essential for the sake of Riggins' own safety or
the safety of others,"79 the majority stated only that the State "might
have been able to justify" such medication by demonstrating that it
was necessary to maintain the defendant in a competent state."0 In
addition, the Court explicitly recognized that because Riggins did not
contend that he had the right to be tried without medication if its
discontinuation rendered him incompetent, the question of whether a
defendant could refuse medication needed to render him competent
for trial was not before it."
'7 Id. at 1815-16.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1815.
'o Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
81 Id.
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A. The Hearing Contemplated by Riggins for Defendants
Seeking to Discontinue Medication and its Impact on Treatment
Practices
Although much of the Court's discussion of these issues is
dicta of the most tentative sort, and Justice Kennedy's more
definitively stated views were his alone, Riggins raises startling and
far-reaching implications for the incompetency-to-stand-trial process.
If followed, the majority's suggestion would require a state seeking
to administer medication to a defendant against the defendant's will
to bear the burden of demonstrating at a judicial hearing that such
medication is both medically appropriate and necessary to maintain
the defendant's competency.82 To carry this burden, the state must
show that this objective could not be achieved "by using less intrusive
means."8 3 The majority's suggestion, because it was dicta, thus does
not resolve the question of whether due process would be satisfied
even if the state makes such a showing. If Justice Kennedy's view
prevails, an additional "extraordinary showing" that the side effects
of any medication administered would not alter a defendant's
demeanor or hamper his ability to participate in the proceedings
would also be required."
Cases involving defendants needing psychotropic medication
in order to be competent to stand trial arise frequently.85 A high
percentage of the approximately 25,000 defendants evaluated for
incompetency each year who are found competent will be taking such
medication at the time of their trial.8 6 An even higher percentage of
82 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 1817-19 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
s See Winick, supra note 13, at 771 (discussing the increasing use of psychotropic
medication for the treatment of mentally ill offenders).
6 See Henry J. Steadman & Eliot Hartstone, Defendants Incompetent to Stand Trial,
in MENTALLY DISORDERED DEFENDANTS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE 39, 41 (John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1983) (estimating that
25,000 defendants are evaluated annually for their competency to stand trial); Bruce J.
Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial: An Assessment of Costs and Benefits and a
Proposal for Reform, 39 RTrrOERS L. REV. 243, 245 (1987). Almost all of those
evaluated for incompetency are mentally ill and many are already taking psychotropic
medication. An estimated 25% of those evaluated are found incompetent. Steadman &
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those found incompetent and returned to court after being restored to
competency will be on medication. 7 Psychotropic medication is the
leading form of treatment administered for the various conditions that
render defendants incompetent to stand trial.8 Moreover, drug
treatment, although it ameliorates symptoms, does not cure the
patient's mental illness; many defendants restored to competency by
the use of these drugs require on-going medication in order to be
maintained in a competent state.8 9 When a defendant is found
incompetent to stand trial, he typically will be committed to a state
mental hospital for treatment designed to restore him to competency."
Hartstone, supra at 41. Virtually all of these defendants will be hospitalized for
treatment, usually involving psychotropic medication. Winick, supra at 254-55; Winick,
supra note 13, at 770-72. Defendants who are restored to competency through the use
of these drugs will frequently require on-going medication. Id. at 772.
" See sources cited supra note 86.
as See Bruce J. Winiek, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REV.
921, 945 (1985). These drugs have been in widespread use in the treatment of trial
incapacity for almost 40 years. See M. Herbert Buschman & Jackson M. Reed, Tranquil-
izers and Competency to Stand Trial, 54 A.B.A. J. 284, 287 (1968); Victor G. Haddox
& Seymour Pollack, Psychopharmaceutical Restoration to Present Sanity (Mental
Competency to Stand Trial), 17 J. FORENSIC So. 568, 576-77 (1972); Leo E. Hollister,
Psychotropic Drugs and Court Competency, in LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTALLY
DISORDERED OFFENDER 14 (Lynn M. Irvine, Jr. & Terry B. Brelje eds., 1972); C.B.
Scrignar, Tranquilizers and the Psychotic Defendant, 53 A.B.A. J. 43, 45 (1967);
Winick, supra note 13, at 771-72, 777-89. A 1967 survey of treatment programs in
facilities for mentally ill offenders revealed that 63 % used psychotropic drugs for "most
or all" patients, making this modality the second most frequently used ("planned and
supervised recreational therapy" was the most frequently used for "most or all" patients,
in 68% of such facilities), and that 96% used psychotropic drugs for either "most or all"
patients or "some" patients, making medication the most frequently used treatment
technique overall. PATRICIA L. SCHEIDEMANDEL & CHARLES K. KANNO, THE
MENTALLY ILL OFFENDER: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT PROGRAMS xiv, 47-48 (1969).
If anything, reliance on psychotropic medication has increased since that time. See
generally Jami Floyd, The Administration of Psychotropic Drugs to Prisoners: State of
the Law and Beyond, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1246 (1990) (documenting the introduction
of psychotropic drugs in the 1950s and their subsequent proliferation for treatment of the
mentally ill).
89 Winick, supra note 13, at 772; Winick, supra note 88, at 945.
'o Ronald Roesch & Stephen L. Golding, Treatment and Disposition of Defendants
Found Incompetent to Stand Trial.: A Review and a Proposal, 2 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 349, 364 (1979); Bruce J. Winick, Incompetency to Stand Trial.:
Developments in the Law, in MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDERS: PERSPECTIVES FROM
LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 3, 14 (John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1983);
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In some cases, such treatment will be ordered on an outpatient basis
in the community, provided the defendant has been released on bail
or on his own recognizance.9"
In ordering treatment for defendants found incompetent to
stand trial, courts rarely engage in a detailed inquiry concerning the
treatment that the defendant will receive. In Jackson v. Indiana,9 a
case involving a defendant thought to be permanently incompetent,
the Supreme Court conditioned incompetency commitment on the
existence of a substantial likelihood that such commitment would
produce a restoration of the defendant's competency within a
foreseeable period.93 However, how and when a defendant will be
restored to competency rarely receives more than the most
perfunctory consideration at the initial commitment stage.
It is not clear whether the required showing suggested in the
majority opinion in Riggins would apply at this initial stage or only
at the later point when a defendant has been restored to competency
and returned to court needing on-going medication. If applied at the
incompetency commitment stage, the Riggins suggestion would add
a significant new element to be determined at the commitment
hearing. Although this new requirement would impose additional
costs on the state and the judicial process, and would occur in a large
percentage of cases in which defendants were found incompetent, it
may have therapeutic advantages that outweigh these costs. Placing
the burden of proof on the state to demonstrate that the use of
Winick, supra note 88, at 933.
91 Winick, supra note 88, at 943.
9 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (holding Indiana violated the due process and equal
protection rights of a mentally retarded deaf mute by committing him for an indefinite
period of time simply because he was incompetent to stand trial for the criminal charges
filed against him).
" Id. at 738. Although Jackson contemplates a clinical prediction concerning
competency restoration at the point of incompetency commitment, because failure to
restore competency appears to be a low base rate phenomenon, restoration to
competency may be difficult to predict. Robert A. Nicholson & John L. McNulty,
Outcome of Hospitalization for Defendants Found Incompetent to Stand Trial, 10
BE- AvIORL SCI. & L. 371, 380 (1992). A recent empirical study of incompetency
commitment outcomes in Oklahoma suggested the limited predictability of a defendants'
level of functioning at discharge. Id. at 381. As a result, although Jackson
contemplates such a prediction, it may be difficult for clinicians to predict competency
restoration and the length of time that it might take. Id. at 380.
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psychotropic medication is both medically appropriate and necessary
for the defendant's restoration to competency would require a more
detailed therapeutic assessment of a defendant prior to his
commitment to the hospital or to outpatient treatment than presently
occurs. This would likely require more comprehensive treatment
planning for such defendants, including more consideration of
alternative treatment methods, than is now performed. Such
treatment planning would provide obvious benefits for the defendant
as well as for the hospital or outpatient facility to which he is
committed for treatment. Although such facilities will conduct their
own assessment of the defendant's condition and will have the
responsibility for preparing their own treatment plans, the treatment
planning process can only benefit from the views of other clinicians
who have recently considered the issues. Moreover, if the
prosecution is unable to carry its burden of proof, unneeded
medication and perhaps unnecessary hospitalization-two of the most
inappropriate burdens sometimes imposed on defendants adjudicated
incompetent to stand trial'-could be avoided.
Of course, these determinations would presumably be required
only in cases in which the defendant raises an objection to treatment
with psychotropic medication. A defendant could consent to such
treatment and many presumably will do so, either explicitly or by
failing to raise an objection. A question may be raised, however, as
to whether a defendant found incompetent to stand trial can waive his
due process right to object to intrusive medication, either explicitly
or implicitly by failing to object, If accepted, Justice Kennedy's view
that incompetent defendants may not constitutionally waive their right
to be tried while competent would presumably suggest a negative
answer to this question.9" It may be appropriate, however, to
distinguish a purported waiver of the right to stand trial while
competent from the waiver of a right to avoid intrusive treatment.
The societal interest in the accuracy and fairness of the criminal trial
process, as well as in its appearance of fairness, might be threatened
9 See Winick, supra note 88, at 943.
91 See Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("I]n my view a
general rule permitting waiver would not withstand scrutiny under the Due Process
Clause... land] would cast doubt on his exercise or waiver of all subsequent rights and
privileges through the whole course of the trial.").
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by allowing defendants to waive their right to be tried while
competent.96 Waiver of a defendant's liberty interest in avoiding
intrusive treatment, by contrast, raises no similar societal concerns,
at least if the treatment involved is not experimental. Accordingly,
the individual affected should be able to waive this liberty interest.97
The question remains, however, whether a defendant found
incompetent to stand trial may waive any rights. The standard for
competency to stand trial, whether the defendant's mental illness
interferes with his ability to understand the nature of the proceedings
and participate with counsel in the making of his defense,98 differs
from the standards usually applied to determine an individual's
competency to provide informed consent to treatment. 99 Moreover,
96 Q Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (affirming trial court ruling that
rejected criminal defendant's consent to representation by an attorney when a conflict of
interest existed and holding refusal of counsel of choice did not violate Sixth
Amendment).
' Cf. Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694 (1982) (recognizing that objections to subject matter jurisdiction, which involves
societal interests in the proper allocation of judicial business may not be waived, but that
the defendant may waive an objection to jurisdiction over the person which involves
merely an individual's personal liberty interest).
' See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (stating that the "test must
be whether he [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."). The separate
components of competency in the Dusky formulation are rarely the subject of separate
inquiry or analysis. For a recent suggestion that analysis concerning incompetency to
stand trial would be advanced by viewing competency not as a single construct, but as
two related but separable constructs-a foundational concept of competence to assist
counsel and a contextualized concept of decisional competence-see Richard J. Bonnie,
The Competence of Criminal Defendants: A Theoretical Reformulation, 10 BEHAVIORAL
Sci. & L. 291 (1992); Richard J. Bonnie, The Competency of Criminal Defendants:
Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539 (1993).
99 See PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND
CLINICAL PRACTICE 82-83 (1987); TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & LEROY WALTERS,
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 71-72 (2d ed. 1982); SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET AL.,
THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 185 & n.73 (3d ed. 1985); THOMAS GRISSO,
EVALUATING COMPETENCIES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENT AND INSTRUMENTS 314 (1986);
Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 279 (1977); Allan M. Tepper & Amiram Elwork, Competence to Consent
to Treatment as a Psycholegal Construct, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 205, 207-08 (1984);
Bruce J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between Assent
and Objection, 28 Hous. L. REV. 15, 24 (1991) (analyzing standards for competency
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under the approach applied in many states, a determination of
incompetency for one purpose does not justify an assumption of
incompetency for other purposes.1" In addition, it may be
appropriate to apply a more relaxed standard of competency for
patients expressing assent to treatment than for those objecting to it,
at least when the patient's choice is clearly voluntary and is in favor
of conventional treatment recommended by his physician.1 'O
Accordingly, defendants, even if found incompetent to stand trial,
may still possess the necessary competency to make treatment
decisions, particularly decisions in favor of treatment. 10 2 Waiver in
this context, at least in appropriate cases, should therefore be
permissible.0 3
to consent to treatment).
10o See Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314
(Mass. 1983) (person committed to a mental institution after being diagnosed as mentally
ill is still considered legally competent to manage his personal affairs); State ex rel.
Jones v. Gerhardstein, 416 N.W.2d 883, 895 (Wis. 1987) (incompetency to make
treatment decisions may not be inferred from a finding of dangerousness); FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.215(b) (West 1989) (adjudication of incompetency to stand trial does not
render defendant incompetent for any other purpose); APPELBAUM, supra note 99;
BRAKEL, ET AL., supra note 99, at 185, 405-07; Tepper & Elwork, supra note 99, at
207; Winick, supra note 99, at 23-24; Winick, supra note 8, at 186.
tI Winick, supra note 99 (advocating such a differential approach to the definition
of competency in the consent to treatment context, and suggesting that medical and judi-
cial practice already reflect such a distinction).
101 E.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.215(b) (West 1989) (adjudication of incompetency to
stand trial does not render defendant incompetent for any other purpose). See Winick,
supra note 99, at 23-24; Winick, supra note 8, at 186-87. Justice Kennedy's suggestion
that incompetent defendants may not waive their right to be tried while in an incompetent
state may itself be questioned. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. See also
Cruzan v. Director Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (competent
patient may decide in advance to exercise her right to refuse life-sustaining treatment or
nutrition during a future persistent vegetative state); State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d 1379,
1382 (N.H. 1978) (competent defendant may voluntarily withdraw from medication
while standing trial agreeing in advance that that if he becomes incompetent as a result
of his withdrawal he may be deemed to have waived his right to be tried while
competent).
"o In order to accept such a waiver, however, a court may need to conduct some
inquiry into an incompetent criminal defendant's competency to waive his right to avoid
intrusive medication. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 133 n.18 (1990)
(suggesting that a state may not permit a mentally ill patient to consent to voluntary
psychiatric hospitalization without "further inquiry" into his competency to provide such
consent) (dictum). For criticism of this dictum, see Winick, supra note 8, at 184-85.
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Even if the determinations suggested in Riggins are not
required to be made at the initial incompetency commitment stage,
the Riggins dicta suggests that they will need to be made, at least for
those objecting to medication, once a defendant has been restored to
competency and returned for trial with a recommendation of ongoing
medication." It can be anticipated that such objections may occur
with increased frequency as a result of Riggins since defense counsel
aware of the Court's decision will presumably advise their clients that
they may have a right to avoid involuntary medication during trial.
Indeed, failure to provide such advice may amount to ineffective
assistance of counsel.1 5 Again, many defendants will not raise such
an objection even if aware of a right to do so. Many defendants will
consider treatment with such medication as having been helpful and
increasing their trial capacities. These defendants may conclude that
continued medication during trial would be beneficial. If these
defendants do not raise an objection to their ongoing medication, the
hearing suggested in Riggins would presumably be unnecessary.
Because these defendants have been restored to competency to stand
trial, their competency to waive any objection to continued
medication should be presumed, at least in the absence of additional
reasons suggesting the need for an inquiry into their competency in
this regard." ° Now that Riggins has drawn attention to the issue,
'o Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815-16.
'o See generally Martin C. Calhoun, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-
Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J.
413, 438-40 (1988) (discussing a checklist of basic components of effective
representation).
106 Some states, by statute or by case law, recognize a presumption in favor of
competency. Winick, supra note 7, at 822 & n.20. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
22 § 1175.4 B. (West Supp. 1986) (establishing a presumption of defendant's
competency to stand trial unless incompetence is proven by a clear and convincing
evidence); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 46.02 § (1)(2)(9)(b) (West 1979)
(establishing a presumption of defendant's competency to stand trial unless incompetence
is proven by a preponderance of the evidence). See also Winick, supra note 99, at 22
& n.19 (arguing that competency to assent to treatment should be presumed in the
absence of specific indications of incompetency); Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572
(1992) (upholding a statutory presumption in favor of competency to stand trial). The
broad dicta in Zinermon, however, may suggest the need for an "inquiry" in all cases
involving mentally ill individuals seeking to waive their rights. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at
133 n. 18. For criticism of the broad implications of this dicta, see Winick, supra note
8, at 182-91.
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however, an increasing number of defendants will probably object to
being medicated during trial. Indeed, Riggins may have the
unintended consequence of encouraging some defendants to assert
such an objection in order to obtain the postponement of their trial
that would occur should discontinuation of medication produce a
reversion to incompetency."°7 For defendants who raise an objection
to continued medication during trial, Riggins requires that a judicial
hearing be held."'8 At that hearing, under the dicta in Riggins, the
prosecution will be required to carry the burden of establishing the
medical appropriateness of such medication as well as the necessity
of imposing it in light of other less intrusive alternatives."°
The Court did not make clear how the "less intrusive means"
element contained in its suggested standard would apply in this
context. When a defendant objects to the administration of
medication, this standard, at a minimum, should be read to require
the discontinuation of medication for a reasonable period of time to
allow for a determination of whether the defendant's competency can
be maintained in the absence of medication.110 Because Riggins never
contended that he had a right to terminate medication even if this
would render him incompetent,"' his pretrial motion, made several
months before his trial was to commence, in effect sought just such
a temporary halt in medication in order to allow an assessment of
whether its continuation was truly necessary to maintain his
competency. Such a trial period without medication is the most
reasonable way of resolving the assertedly conflicting interests of the
"7 See Medina, 112 S. Ct. at 2582 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting concern that
some defendants assert incompetency in order to attempt to avoid trial). But see
Symposium, Malingering andDeception: An Update, 8 BEHAVIORALSCI. & L. 1,27-53,
85-92 (1990) (discussing the ability of clinical examiners to detect malingering).
"' Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
109 Id.
n' See State v. Riggins, 808 P.2d 535, 540 (Nev. 1991) (Rose, J., concurring).
Judge Rose noted that two psychiatrists who examined Riggins believed that his
psychosis was "probably caused by drug abuse; and . . . terminating the drug would
have no effect on his behavior." Id. at 540. Judge Rose believed Riggins should have
been allowed to terminate the medication, preferring a showing that the medication was
absolutely necessary along with evidence of defendant's behavior without medication.
Id. See also Winick, supra note 13, at 813 (suggesting that alternative methods should
be tried before a more intrusive technique like psychotropic medication is used).
. Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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parties by determining whether an accommodation is possible that
satisfies both the defendant's interest in avoiding unwanted
medication and the state's interest in bringing him to trial.
Moreover, a trial period without medication is medically appropriate
and can have significant therapeutic value."' Indeed, medical
literature calls for a reexamination of prolonged maintenance of
antipsychotic drug therapy and suggests that "drug free holidays"
should be attempted periodically to assess the patient's condition
without medication in order to determine its continued necessity.,
If such a trial period without medication should fail in the
sense that the defendant reverts to an incompetent state, the "less
intrusive means" standard would then require that other less intrusive
treatment approaches be considered before medication is resumed.
For this purpose, it is useful to conceive of the various mental health
treatment modalities used in the treatment of defendants found
incompetent to stand trial as generally falling along a rough
112 John M. Davis, Overview: Maintenance Therapy Psychiatry: I. Schizophrenia,
132 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1237, 1242-43 (1975).
113 See American College of Neuropsychopharmacology-Food and Drug
Administration Task Force, Neurological SyndromesAssociated with Antipsychotic Drug
Use: A Special Report, 28 ARCMvEs GEN. PSYCHIATRY 463, 465 (1973); Frank J. Ayd,
Treatment-Resistant Patients: A Moral, Legal and Therapeutic Challenge, in RATIONAL
PSYCHOPHARMACOTHERAPY AND THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT 1, 37, 49-50 (Frank J. Ayd
ed., 1975); Ross J. Baldessarini & Joseph F. Lipinski, Risks Versus Benefits of Antipsy-
chotic Drugs, 289 NEw ENO. J. MED. 427, 428 (1973); Davis, supra note 112, at 1242-
43; George Gardos & Jonathan 0. Cole, Maintenance Antipsychotic Therapy: Is the Cure
Worse Than the Disease?, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 32, 34-36 (1976); Robert F. Prien &
C. James Klett, An Appraisal of the Long-term Use of Tranquilizing Medication with
Hospitalized Chronic Schizophrenics: A Review of the Drug Discontinuation Literature,
5 ScHzoPHRENIA BULL. 64 (1972); Winick, supra note 13, at 813-14. Some medical
commentators have suggested that perhaps 50% of outpatient schizophrenics might not
be worse off if their medications were withdrawn. Id. at 813. But see John M. Davis,
Antipsychotic Drugs, in 2 COMPREHEN SIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 1591, 1609
(Harold I. Kaplan & Benjamin J. Sadock eds., 5th ed. 1989) (stating that although drug
free holidays have been suggested as a means of reducing the risk of tardive dyskinesia,
there are no controlled studies supporting this proposal; moreover, some clinical
observations hint at the opposite results); Catherine M. Tanner & Harold L. Klawans,
Tardive Dyskinesia: Prevention and Treatment, 9 Clinical Neuropharmacology S-76, S-
77 (Supp. 2 1986) ("Although drug-free periods during neuroleptic treatment regiments
have been proposed by some as a means of decreasing the risk of developing tardive
dyskinesia, others have reported an increase in tardive in patients having frequent drug-
free periods.").
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continuum of intrusiveness.11 4 Psychotherapy and other verbal and
educational approaches, as well as at least most of the behavioral
treatment techniques including those using positive reinforcement,
modeling, contingency contracting, systematic desensitization, and
possibly even some of the aversive conditioning approaches, can be
considered generally less intrusive than medication, particularly
antipsychotic and antidepressant medication."' Moreover, these
techniques do not involve side effects that would negatively affect the
defendant's demeanor at trial or ability to communicate with counsel
or to participate in the proceedings. 11 6 Unfortunately, however, many
individuals who are sufficiently impaired by mental illness to be
found incompetent to stand trial may not respond effectively to these
other treatment modalities unless these treatments are also
accompanied by psychotropic medication. Thus, the "less intrusive
means" standard should be read to require that only those alternative
methods which are feasible and stand a reasonable chance of success
should be attempted. If expert testimony clearly predicts that
alternative approaches will not be effective for the defendant, at least
hA Winick, supra note 13, at 813. For a proposed continuum of intrusiveness along
which the various mental health treatment techniques can be ranked for purposes of
applying a "less intrusive means" standard, see Winick, Legal Limitations, supra note
9, at 351-73; Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A First
Amendment Perspective, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 63-90 (1989).
115 See Winick, supra note 114, at 80-90. Some treatment techniques can be seen
as more intrusive than psychotropic medication. Unless a defendant expressed a
preference for such a technique instead of medication, the Court's "less intrusive means"
standard would not require use of such arguably more intrusive approaches. For
example, an incompetent defendant suffering from severe depression may be treated with
electroconvulsive therapy (ECT). Because ECT is arguably more intrusive than
antidepressant medication, the Court's approach would not require that a defendant
objecting to trial on antidepressant drugs be given ECT. Id. at 67-68.
,. Winick, LegalLimitations, supra note 9, at 357-64. For the same reason, when
the state seeks to administer medication involuntarily in the jail to a defendant awaiting
trial who is asserted to be dangerous to other inmates or to jail staff, the least intrusive
alternative principle should require that other, less intrusive approaches, first be
attempted before medication can be justified. When the defendant resists medication in
this situation, the state should attempt less intrusive approaches like psychotherapy,
behavioral techniques, isolation, institutional discipline, or even restraints as a means of
preventing violence before it should be permitted to resort to intrusive medication that
may produce adverse effects on the defendant's demeanor or trial performance. See
Winick, supra note 114, at 97.
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in the absence of medication, such approaches should not be required
to be attempted. Where the expert testimony does not clearly
eliminate the possibility that other approaches may be efficacious,
however, they should be attempted in an effort to determine whether
medication is truly necessary to maintain the defendant's competency.
Even if one or more of these other approaches seems unlikely to
succeed in the absence of medication, their combination with
medication might enable a lower dose of medication to be used, thus
providing a less intrusive method of treatment by minimizing the risk
of adverse side effects which impair the defendant's demeanor or trial
performance.1 1 7
If medication proves to be required to enable the defendant to
remain in a competent state, the "less restrictive means" standard
should be construed to require use of the minimum possible dose
consistent with achieving this effect. Such a dose will not only
minimize the extent of the intrusion on the defendant's liberty
interest, but also minimize the risk that the medication itself will
impair the defendant's trial functioning or his demeanor during trial.
To best achieve this result, the trial court should give the defendant's
treating psychiatrist considerable flexibility to experiment with
different drugs at differing doses in order to achieve a maximum
degree of functioning while minimizing side effects impairing the
defendant's trial ability and demeanor. Of course, the defendant's
mental condition may change over time requiring the trial court to be
sensitive to the need to reassess the situation if and when such a
change occurs.
If adverse effects of medication impairing the defendant's trial
ability or demeanor materialize despite predictions to the contrary,
the trial court should reconsider the matter and even postpone the
trial when appropriate. Defense counsel will presumably be alert to
the emergence of any problems adversely affecting the defendant's
ability to communicate with counsel, to follow the proceedings, to
participate in strategic decisionmaking, or to testify and respond
117 See generally Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science,
and the Development of Mental Disability Law Jurisprudence, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCI. &
L. 47, 57 (1993) (discussing the serious neurological side effects that can result from
antipsychotic drugs); Winick, supra note 13, at 782 (discussing the serious neurological
side effects that can result from antipsychotic drugs).
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appropriately, as well as any changes in the defendant's demeanor
that may be prejudicial. Riggins places a special measure of
professional responsibility on defense counsel to monitor his client's
condition closely."' Counsel should bring any such problems to the
attention of the court and, when appropriate, request a hearing
concerning such problems. In this way, counsel can insure that a
record is made for potential appellate purposes, thus affording
appellate courts the opportunity to assess the impact of any drug-
induced impairment on the fairness of the proceedings below.
Even though the suggestions contained in Riggins are dicta,
they will probably be broadly followed by trial courts in order to
avoid potential due process challenges by defendants convicted while
on medication who do not receive such hearings. The hearing
contemplated by Riggins should be a useful device to protect a
defendant's right to a fair trial and his due process liberty interest in
avoiding unwanted medication. Moreover, it should have beneficial
effects from a therapeutic perspective. Judicial inquiry into the
medical appropriateness and necessity of medication will inevitably
decrease the extent of unnecessary and inappropriate administration
of these drugs. In addition, application of the "less intrusive means"
standard in the ways suggested in this Article should create a greater
sensitivity to the need to minimize the dose of any medication that
proves to be needed, thus beneficially reducing the extent of adverse
side effects.
Riggins will also have the inevitable effect of improving the
quality of psychiatric care in the jail. Many jails do not have
adequate psychiatric staff to deal with the problems that Riggins
11 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1983) (counsel for an
impaired client bears a special degree of professional responsibility). The trial court
should be especially alert to the potential breakdown in the adversary system that can
occur when defense counsel is less than effective in representing a mentally ill defendant.
Although many defense attorneys are excellent trial lawyers who zealously represent
their client's interests, some fall far short of the standard. See, e.g., Goodwin v.
Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 817 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding neglect during petit jury
selection, failure to evaluate pretrial defense, lack of investigation and general attitude
amount to ineffective counsel).
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raises; indeed, the care provided is often deficient and defective. 1 9
With the exception of defendants released on bail or on their own
recognizance, the jail will be the principle location in which
medication is administered during the pretrial and trial stages dealt
with in Riggins. The hearings now required by Riggins in these cases
will focus judicial and public attention on the inadequate level of care
provided which in turn should prompt a needed expansion of mental
health programs in jails and prisons.
In addition to the suggested standards contained in the
majority opinion in Riggins, some jurisdictions may also require the
"extraordinary showing" proposed by Justice Kennedy as a
supplemental condition for permitting involuntary medication. Under
this additional requirement, prosecutors will also need to demonstrate
that medication will not alter the defendant's demeanor or hinder his
ability to participate in the proceedings."12 Although Justice Kennedy
expressed doubt that this standard could be met, its satisfaction may
not be as difficult as he supposed. After all, Riggins was
administered an extremely high dose of Mellaril during trial, 800 mg
per day, a dose that is at the outer limits of medical acceptability. 2
Indeed, a psychiatrist testified at Riggins' trial that a daily dose of
800 mg of Mellaril was a "very, very high" dose, sufficient to
"tranquilize an elephant."' 22 Much of Justice Kennedy's discussion
of the impact of the side effects of Mellaril on a defendant's
119 See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, TASK FORCE REPORT No. 29, PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES IN JAILS AND PRISONS 2 (Mar. 1989); Edward Kaufman, The Violation of
Psychiatric Standards of Care in Prisons, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 566, (1980); John
Petrich, Psychiatric Treatment in Jail.: An Experiment in Health Care Delivery, 27 HoSP.
& COMM. PSYCHIATRY 413, 413-15 (1976); Edwin V. Valdiserri, Psychiatry Behind
Bars, 12 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 93, 93, 97 (1984). See also Brief for the
American Psychiatric Association and the American Medical Association as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 19, Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990) (No.
89-5120) ("Despite an unquestioned need, the provision of psychiatric care in the
Nation's prisons and jails leaves much to be desired.").
' See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
121 See MEDICAL ECONOMICS Co., PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2012 (46th ed.
1992) ("[M]aximum [dosage] of 800 mg daily, if necessary") [hereinafter MEDICAL
ECONOMICS CO.]; C. LINDSAY DEVANE ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MoNrrORINo
PSYCHOACTIVE DRUO THERAPY 377 (1990).
'2 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1819 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting the testimony of
Dr. Jurasky, who found Riggins to be incompetent).
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demeanor and ability to participate during trial seems to have been
heavily colored by the facts of Riggins' case, involving this extremely
high dose of the drug.123 For example, he discussed the variety of
side effects, including drowsiness, lack of alertness, and depression
of psychomotor functions that often accompany large doses of
Mellaril-effects emphasized by one of the psychiatrists who testified
at Riggins' trial."2 Justice Kennedy also quoted this psychiatrist's
testimony: "If you take a lot of it you become stoned for all practical
purposes and can barely function. "'25
800 mg of Mellaril per day, however, is an unusually high
dose of antipsychotic medication.1 26  Most patients needing
antipsychotic medication will be placed on considerably smaller
doses, producing correspondingly less severe interference with
demeanor, concentration, and ability to communicate with counsel. 127
Although most of these drugs are sedating at the initiation of their
administration, dosage is often reduced over time and patients become
accustomed to their effects. 128 Indeed, good psychopharmacological
practice contemplates maintaining the patient on as low a dose of such
drugs as is consistent with therapeutic effectiveness.129 Even at small
doses of psychotropic medication, some patients will experience
sedation, confusion, and other side effects interfering with
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
' See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
''Winick, supra note 13, at 781-84.
12' See id. at 782-83. At therapeutic dosages to which the patient has become
habituated, "the general level of awareness and the various cognitive functions (such as
memory, discrimination,judgment) are little affected." Id. (quoting Charles Solow, Drug
Therapy of Mental Illness: Tranquilizers and Other Depressant Drugs, in AN
INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 298 (Richard H. Rech & Kenneth E. Moore
eds., 1971). "Clouding of consciousness does not occur with conventional doses." Id.
(quoting Murray E. Jarvik, Drugs Used in the Treatment of Psychiatric Disorders, in
THE PHARMACOLOGICAL BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 167 (Louis S. Goodman & Alfred
Gilman eds., 4th ed. 1970). Moreover, although sedation often results in the first few
days of medication and may be quite heavy following high dosages, this effect usually
disappears within several weeks, either by the patient developing tolerance to the drug's
sedative properties or by his physician's finding a suitable dosage.
I2 Davis, supra note 112, at 1243; Richard I. Shader, On Guidelines for Maximum
Dosage, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 499, 500 (1978); Winick, supra note 13, at 784 n.77.
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concentration at trial as well as their ability to communicate with
counsel.13° But many will not suffer these effects once stabilized on
the drugs."
The precise effects on each defendant, of course, will be the
subject of judicial inquiry. When the side effects of medication
seriously interfere with a defendant's ability to follow the proceedings
or communicate with counsel, he may be incompetent to stand trial
even while on medication."' For many defendants, however, the
positive effects of the drugs on their trial capacities will offset the
adverse side effects, if any, that they experience. The primary effect
of these drugs is to normalize the patient by restoring the individual
to his natural state prior to his mental illness. 33 The mental
functioning of many defendants and their ability to participate in trial
proceedings thus will be facilitated by such medication, particularly
at proper dosage levels. For these defendants, the question will be
whether the adverse side effects which continue after dosage has been
regulated will hamper their demeanor or trial functioning in ways that
are prejudicial. In making this determination, expert witnesses will
be needed to determine whether any impairment of the defendant's
demeanor or trial abilities is attributable to the side effects of
medication or to the defendant's underlying mental illness. The
competent defendant impaired by mental illness will still be subject
to trial notwithstanding his continued deficits. 34 In this way, Justice
"3 Winick, supra note 13, at 781-84.
'Id. at 782-83.
132 See id. at 784, 808.
133 See Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. Gutheil, 'Rotting With Their Rights On':
Constitutional Theory and Clinical Reality in Drug Refusal by Psychiatric Patients, 7
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 306, 308 (1979) (stating that psychotropic drugs
are "normative in their mechanism of action: that is, they restore existing imbalance
toward the balanced norm."); Thomas G. Guthiel & Paul S. Appelbaum, "Mind Con-
trol,' "S ynthetic Sanity," "Artificial Competence," and Genuine Confusion: Legally
Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic Medication, 12 HOFSTRA L. REv. 77, 101 (1983)
[hereinafter Guthiel & Appelbaum, Mind Control] (referring to the "acknowledged
normalizing effects of the antipsychotic medications"); id. at 118 (referring to the
"normalizing effects" of the drugs; the drugs facilitate "the re-emergence of normal
patterns of cognition"; "their effect is to alter mental functioning in the direction of
normality"); Winick, supra note 114, at 58.
114 Winick, supra note 13, at 808.
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Kennedy's concerns would only be raised if a defendant's impairment
is attributable to the side effects of medication.
Even for those whose ability to follow the proceedings and
communicate with counsel is not impaired by on-going medication,
some alteration of demeanor may nonetheless occur. The side effects
of antipsychotic medication referred to by Justice Kennedy, may alter
demeanor in ways that negatively affect the trier of fact's overall
impression of the defendant."' The extrapyramidal side effects of
these drugs involve bizarre movements of the face and limbs. These
effects may produce fear and anxiety, in the members of the jury, as
well as, the prejudice that many members of the public have against
the mentally ill. 36 In some cases it may be possible, where these
effects on demeanor are the only problems caused by continued
medication, that expert testimony or a jury instruction concerning
these effects may be sufficient to avoid potential prejudice. 13 7 If not,
however, or if other side effects persist that prejudicially affect trial
functioning, Justice Kennedy's proposal would require involuntary
medication to be discontinued.138
' Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814-15, 1818-20 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See Winick,
supra note 13, at 782 (discussing the side effects of antipsychotic medication). The
nature and extent of adverse side effects of the antipsychotic drugs presumably will
change over time as new drugs are introduced. Indeed, recently introduced antipsychotic
drugs like Clozapine seem to produce few, if any, extrapyramidal effects. However, it
may produce other side effects, like drowsiness and impaired mental functioning, which
may affect trial performance. See MEDICAL ECONOMICS CO., supra note 121, at 2000-
02; Linda C. Fentiman, Whose Right Is It Anyway?: Rethinking Competency to Stand
Trial in Light of the Synthetically Sane Insanity Defendant, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109,
1129-31 (1986); Peter Margulies, The Cognitive Politics of Professional Conflict: Law
Reform, Mental Health Treatment Technology, and Citizen Self-Governance, 5 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 25, 28-29 (1992). Accordingly, the Court's holding with regard to drugs
like Mellaril may not cover other drugs producing less serious side effects interfering
with trial performance.
136 See Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 117, at 57.
'"See generally Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816 (finding that such expert testimony will
not be sufficient to cure potential prejudice where side effects also impair the defendant's
ability to testify, communicate with counsel, or participate in trial decisionmaking).
Whether a jury instruction should be given, of course, should be left to the defendant.
Im See Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1820 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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B. Disposition of Defendants Permitted to Discontinue
Medication Who Become Incompetent to Stand Trial as a Result
Riggins leaves many unanswered questions concerning the
disposition of defendants for whom the prosecution is unable to make
the showings suggested in the majority opinion as conditions for
forced medication or the additional "extraordinary showing"
suggested by Justice Kennedy. In cases in which the majority
opinion's suggestions are not satisfied, the trial court presumably
would be required to grant the defendant's motion for termination of
medication and set a trial date or hearing to accept any guilty plea.
Because discontinuation of antipsychotic medication may produce a
resumption of severe symptoms,'" 9 a reasonable period of time should
be permitted to elapse before any such trial or hearing on acceptance
of a plea can occur. Indeed, it may be appropriate, if psychotic
symptoms reemerge after the defendant has spent several weeks
without medication, for the court to order a reevaluation of the
defendant's competency to stand trial or plead guilty.
During this period the defendant, unless released on bail or
on his own recognizance, probably will be housed in the jail.
Because he is competent, commitment to a forensic hospital facility
would seem inappropriate unless deemed necessary for further
competency evaluation or treatment. For most defendants, evaluation
of whether termination of medication has caused a reversion to
incompetency can occur in the jail or in a court mental health clinic.
These patients, however, may require access to mental health services
not available in the jail. Although major urban areas will have a
prison mental health services unit serving the jail, perhaps even
including a prison ward, many jails do not have clinical staff for this
purpose or access to clinical programs in the community willing to
provide such services in the jail.' 40 One effect of Riggins will be to
increase the need for expanded jail capabilities to serve the needs of
mentally ill detainees.
If after several weeks the defendant does not experience a
resumption of psychotic symptoms, or if any problems encountered
are insufficient to render him incompetent to stand trial or to raise the
139 See Guthiel & Applebaum, Mind Control, supra note 133, at 100.
" See sources cited supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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concerns discussed by Justice Kennedy, 41 then his trial or plea
hearing may proceed. If termination of medication renders the
defendant incompetent to stand trial, however, the Riggins decision
provides little guidance as to what should occur. In such cases, the
defendant's response to termination of medication can be used by the
prosecution as a basis for a renewed attempt to carry its burden of
establishing the necessity of medication. Faced with the results of an
unsuccessful trial period without medication, trial courts will probably
be more disposed to require that medication be resumed. If a
resumption of medication succeeds in restoring the defendant to
competency, his trial will be scheduled unless he again raises an
objection to being tried on medication. 4 2 Having experienced the
decompensating effects of drug termination, many defendants may not
wish to renew their prior objection to medication.
Some defendants concerned about the prejudicial effects of
medication on their performance at trial, however, will again object
to being medicated during trial. For these defendants, Riggins will
require the prosecution to carry the burden of establishing that
continued medication is both medically appropriate and essential to
permitting the defendant to be tried. 43 If these showings are made,
the trial court will face the question of whether Justice Kennedy's
proposed additional "extraordinary showing" should also be
required." If not required, the trial will proceed with the question
of possible adverse effects on trial performance deferred until a future
motion for mistrial or until appeal.145 If Justice Kennedy's additional
showing is required, and if the prosecution is able to make it, trial
will also proceed, with the possibility that the issue will reemerge at
'~' Concerns raised by Justice Kennedy include whether administering antipsychotic
drugs will alter the defendant's capacity to react to testimony and to assist counsel, will
compromise defendant's chance for a fair trial, and constrain defendant's free will.
Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1818-20 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
142 Winick, supra note 13, at 778-89.
143 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
4 Id. at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (requiring the state to show that there is no
significant risk that medication will impair or alter the defendant's capacity or
willingness to react to testimony or assist counsel at trial in any material way).
145 Id. at 1819 (stating that medication may alter defendant's demeanor in a
prejudicial manner or otherwise interefere in trial performance, raising serious due
process concerns).
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trial or on appeal. If the prosecution cannot make this additional
showing, trial will be suspended and the defendant will again be
permitted to discontinue medication. 146
Two of these categories of defendants raise problems that
merit further analysis. Section C discusses the merits of adopting
Justice Kennedy's proposed additional requirement. Assuming it is
adopted, as it may be in at least some jurisdictions, Section D then
discusses the disposition of defendants for whom the prosecution is
unable to make this additional showing. The remainder of Section B
analyzes the question of the disposition of defendants for whom the
prosecution is unable to make the showing suggested in the Riggins
majority opinion even after drug termination has produced a reversion
to incompetency.
Due to their incompetence, the trial of these defendants must
be indefinitely suspended, to be resumed only when and if the
defendant's condition improves to the point that he regains
competency to stand trial without drugs.147 During this period, the
state may attempt to obtain an order committing the defendant for less
intrusive types of treatment (assuming the defendant continues to
assert a right to refuse medication).' 48  For many defendants,
however, such a commitment that did not permit the use of
medication would seem unlikely to result in a restoration of
competency within a reasonable period. Hospitalization alone or
treatments other than medication may not sufficiently reduce the
severe symptoms of the major mental illnesses that produce
incompetency to enable these defendants to improve sufficiently to
meet the competency standard.149 When restoration to competency
seems unlikely without medication, Jackson v. Indiana"'° would
prevent the defendant's continued incompetency commitment
requiring the state to initiate proceedings under the state's civil
1Id. at 1820.
1' Winick, supra note 86, at 255.
'41 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
1' See Winick, supra note 13, at 813-14.
1o 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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commitment statute should it wish to continue to confine him in a
hospital. I"
In a case in which Jackson would prevent incompetency
commitment, the state would presumably be required to release the
defendant unless the state meets civil commitment criteria. 152
Probably few such defendants will be released, however. Those who
continue to be dangerous to themselves or others will meet typical
civil commitment standards.' For the few defendants who do not
meet civil commitment standards, however, and therefore must be
released, release will not dispose of their criminal charges. Jackson
does not require dismissal of criminal charges even for permanently
incompetent defendants."S Accordingly, if a released defendant were
to become competent to stand trial in the future, the state could
resume his prosecution.'55
"' Jackson, 406 U.S. at 738. If the defendant is permitted to exercise a right to
refuse psychotropic medication at the hospital, civil commitment might not be
constitutionally permissible unless it was determined that such hospitalization without
medication was in his medical interests. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780,
1784-85 (1992) (continuing indefinite hospitalization of an individual found not guilty by
reason of insanity and committed to a hospital for the criminally insane when evidence
indicated that he no longer was mentally ill violates due process).
s2 See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 729-30 (requiring release for permanently incompetent
defendants not meeting civil commitment criteria).
5 Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. at 1783, 1786, 1787-88 & n.6 (referring to
mental illness and dangerousness as dual requirements for commitment to a psychiatric
facility). See generally Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
87 HARV. L. REv. 1190 (1974) (analyzing civil commitment standards and procedures).
These defendants will differ from the insanity acquittee in Foucha whom the Court held
could not continue to be confined in a mental hospital, even though he continued to be
dangerous, because he was no longer mentally ill. Defendants who are incompetent to
stand trial, because they continue to be mentally ill, may constitutionally be confined if
they are also dangerous to themselves or others and such hospitalization is medically
appropriate. See Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786.
" Jackson, 406 U.S. at 739-41; Winick, supra note 90, at 10.
'55 See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 739. If a sufficient period of time has passed prior to
a resumption of prosecution, the defendant may be able to raise a speedy trial or due
process objection to such delay. Id. at 740. See also Doggett v. United States, 112 S.
Ct. 2686, 2691 (1992) ("Mhe presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused
intensifies over time."). Such an objection would probably fail, however. The delay
would be due to the defendant's incompetency to stand trial and his election to
discontinue the medication that would otherwise maintain his competency. As a result,
the reason for the delay-one of the crucial factors in the speedy trial calculus-would
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C. Should Justice Kennedy's Proposed "Extraordinary Showing"
Be Required?
If the prosecution is required to make the additional
"extraordinary showing" proposed by Justice Kennedy's concurring
opinion, the number of defendants permitted to discontinue
medication will be larger, as will the number of those who revert to
incompetency as a result. Justice Kennedy suggested that the state be
required to demonstrate that continued medication would not alter the
defendant's demeanor or hinder his ability to participate in the
proceedings. 56 If the state could not carry this burden, it would be
unable to medicate the defendant over his objection. Of course, it is
not clear that the full Court would adopt Justice Kennedy's proposal.
Therefore, until the Court resolves the issue, trial courts will need to
make their own determination of whether to impose this requirement.
Termination of medication would frustrate the state's interest
in trying many of the defendants who are permitted to exercise a right
to refuse the drugs. A state's interest in bringing a defendant to trial
for whom probable cause exists that he has committed a crime
touches concerns at the core of its police power. 57 As a result, it
seems unquestionably to qualify as a compelling governmental
interest."5 ' In her opinion for the Court in Riggins, Justice O'Connor
not be counted against the state. See id. at 2691, 2693; Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,
534-36 (1972) (establishing length of delay, reason for delay, defendant's assertion of
right, and prejudice to the defendant as criteria to be assessed in determining speedy trial
claims).
" Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1825 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
157 See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976) ("The promotion of safety of
persons and property is unquestionably at the core of the State's police power.").
" Winick, supra note 13, at 812. A majority of the lower courts have upheld the
involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs to restore or maintain a defendant's
competency for trial. United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 304-05 (4th Cir. 1988)
(en banc) (rejecting asserted right to refuse medication justified by need to restore
competence for trial), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990); Khiem v. United States, 612
A.2d 160, 168-69 (D.C. 1992) (prosecution had fundamental interest in medicating
defendant to bring him to trial where he could never be tried absent such medication);
People v. Hardesty, 362 N.W.2d 787, 793 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (incompetent accused
may be made competent through medication even if medication will need to be continued
throughout the trial); Ybarra v. State, 731 P.2d 353, 356 (Nev. 1987) (competent
defendant was not forced to stand trial while incompetent solely on the basis that he had
been drugged); State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d 1379, 1382 (N.H. 1978) (incompetent accused
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strongly suggested that this interest would be deemed to override the
defendant's interest in resisting medication.159 Moreover, Justice
O'Connor noted that even though prejudice at trial might occur, "trial
prejudice can sometimes be justified by an essential state interest. ""
Since the record in Riggins contained no findings supporting a
conclusion that involuntary medication was "necessary to accomplish
an essential state policy," however, the Court could not conclude that
the substantial likelihood of prejudice was justified. 161
The Court, therefore, explicitly left open the question of
whether a different result might be appropriate on a record
establishing that involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medication was necessary to accomplish the state's "essential" interest
in bringing an accused to trial because he otherwise would become
incompetent. This open question-whether the state's interest would
outweigh the prejudice resulting from requiring the accused to stand
trial on such medication-is a troubling one. Justice Kennedy
indicated that he would strike the balance in favor of the defendant's
right to a fair trial, expressing the view that the Constitution "requires
that society bear this cost in order to preserve the integrity of the trial
may be made competent through medication); State v. Law, 244 S.E.2d 302, 307 (S.C.
1978) (absent a showing of prejudice, medicated defendant was not denied a fair trial);
State v. Lover, 707 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (forced medication to gain
competence to stand trial is valid if court determines it improves defendant's ability to
assist in defense, if it is the least intrusive means to bring defendant to competency, and
if the effects of medication can be explained to jury). But see Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d
1387, 1395 (10th Cir. 1984) (pretrial detainee has liberty interest in avoiding unwanted
medication administered to treat him for trial incompetency), cert. denied, 496 U.S.
1214 (1985); Fentiman, supra note 135, at 1168-69 (arguing that an insanity defendant
has a constitutional right to be tried while incompetent without compulsory adminis-
tration of psychotropic medication).
"9 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815 (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("Constitutional power to bring an accused to trial is
fundamental to a scheme of 'ordered liberty' and prerequisite to social justice and
peace.").
"o Id. at 1816-17 (citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. (1986) 560, 568-69
(recognizing that shackling a defendant may be justified by an essential state interest) and
Allen, 397 U.S. at 344 (binding and gagging the accused permissible only in extreme
situations where it is the "fairest and most reasonableway" to control a disruptive defen-
dant)).
" Id. at 1817.
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process." 62 It is by no means clear, however, that the full Court
would reach this conclusion in a case in which a trial court had made
explicit findings that (1) without medication the defendant would be
incompetent; (2) his competency can be maintained through the use
of medication; and (3) no other less intrusive alternative treatment
approaches would produce this result.
If such findings were explicitly made and documented in the
record, thereby satisfying the requirements suggested in the
majority's opinion, it would appear likely that the Court would permit
the defendant to be tried while on medication, perhaps even if the
record reflected a likelihood of the type of prejudice resulting from
drug side effects about which Justice Kennedy seemed so concerned.
At least absent any likelihood of trial prejudice, the state's compelling
interest in resolving the criminal charges would seem, under
conventional constitutional analysis, to outweigh the defendant's
liberty interest in being free of unwanted antipsychotic medication. 163
Let us assume that the defendant's liberty interest is considered to be
fundamental, as arguably it should be in the case of antipsychotic
medication, which is highly intrusive on mental processes and bodily
privacy.'1 Nevertheless, the state's interests will satisfy the
standards of strict scrutiny typically applied to measure infringements
on fundamental constitutional rights.' The state, if it satisfied
" Id. at 1820 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
16 See Winick, Right to Refiuse, supra note 9, at 16-21 (analyzing the balancing of
interests in right to refuse medication cases).
'" See Winick, supra note 114, at 60-63 (arguing that involuntary administration of
antipsychotic medication implicates a First Amendment right to be free of interference
with mental processes); Winick, Right To Refuse, supra note 9, at 9-12 (discussing First
Amendment basis for right to refuse medication); id. at 12-14 (discussing right to
privacy basis for right to refuse medication). See also Bee, 744 F.2d at 1387
(antipsychotic drug's negative effect on the ability to think and communicate may violate
a defendant's First Amendment rights); Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 838 (3d Cir.
1981) (en banc) (due process right to privacy basis for right to refuse medication);
Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1362 (D. Mass. 1979) (due process right to privacy
basis for right to refuse medication), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st
Cir. 1980) (en banc).
115 See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (First
Amendment); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (First Amendment); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1972) (right of privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(right of privacy). See also Winick, supra note 114, at 90-92 (discussing strict scrutiny
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Justice O'Connor's suggested standard, will have demonstrated both
the compelling governmental interest that medication is necessary to
allow a determination of the criminal charges and that no less
intrusive alternative means will accomplish that interest. 16 These
showings should allow the state to override the defendant's liberty
interest even if considered fundamental.
When the likelihood of trial prejudice exists, however, the
balance arguably should be struck differently. The majority's
observation that "trial prejudice can sometimes be justified by an
essential state interest, "167 suggests that it may not be willing to insist
on Justice Kennedy's additional requirement. Illinois v. Allen, 16 the
case relied on by the majority for the proposition that an "essential
state interest" may sometimes outweigh a defendant's interest in
avoiding prejudice at trial, does not seem analogous to the Riggins
situation, however. 169 Although the defendant in Allen was mentally
ill, he was competent to stand trial. 17' As a result, the Court in Allen
was faced with the need to find a way to avoid allowing a competent
defendant to frustrate the state's ability to try him by intentionally
behaving in a way which would disrupt courtroom decorum. In the
Riggins context, however, the defendant is asserting a right to
discontinue unwanted intrusive medication that he has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding. In this respect,
the two situations cannot be equated since the defendant in Allen had
no right to behave disruptively in court. Moreover, the prejudice
suffered by a defendant in Riggins' situation may be more serious
than that resulting from requiring a defendant to stand trial while
bound and gagged because the side effects of medication may so alter
the defendant's demeanor that the trier of fact forms the impression
as applied to First Amendment rights); Bruce J. Winick, On Autonomy: Legal and
Psychological Perspectives, 37 VILL. L. REv. 1705, 1737-39 (1993) (discussing strict
scrutiny as applied to substantive due process).
'6 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
17 Id. at 1812.
'1 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
'" Compare Riggins, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (involving the question of whether a defendant
could be tried while being medicated) with Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (involving the question
of whether an obstreperous defendant repeatedly warned about his disruptive behavior
could be tried while bound and gagged).
'70 Allen, 397 U.S. at 351-52 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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that his testimony lacks credibility. Moreover, these side effects
could possibly affect the content of his testimony itself. In short, as
Justice Kennedy observed, involuntarily imposed medication can have
the potential of "manipulat[ing] material evidence" when it affects the
defendant's demeanor to the point that it alters the presentation of his
defense. 7 ' Although binding and gagging a defendant may affect the
jury's attitude towards him by emphasizing that he has misbehaved
in court, it does not necessarily affect the jury's assessment of the
defendant's case as does the resulting side effects of forced
medication. A defendant in the Allen situation who wished to testify
would presumably be permitted to do so without his gag; a defendant
in the Riggins situation may not be able to present his defense free of
the impairing effects of his medication.
Justice Kennedy's additional requirement thus seems an
appropriate measure to protect against an unfair trial. If medication
so interferes with the defendant's demeanor or trial functioning that
prejudice seems likely, the resulting verdict may be inaccurate. The
state's "essential interest" is in obtaining a substantially accurate
disposition of the criminal charges. 72 If this becomes unlikely due
to the side effects of antipsychotic medication in a particular case, it
may be preferable to postpone disposition of the charges or even to
avoid adjudication altogether. Unless a reasonably accurate
disposition of the charges is possible, the state's interest in trying the
defendant on medication should not be considered to outweigh the
defendant's right to a fair trial.
Although the full Court may be disinclined to require a
demonstration that no substantial risk of drug-induced trial prejudice
exists as a condition for permitting an involuntarily medicated
defendant to stand trial, as Justice Kennedy proposed, this
"extraordinary showing" seems to be an appropriate means of
avoiding such prejudice. At the very least, an inquiry into the
potential for prejudice may have a salutary effect on medication
practices, resulting in lower dose levels in order to minimize the risk
17' Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that suppression by the prosecution of material evidence
favorable to the accused violates due process)).
'" See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1729 (1993) ("[IThe central goal of
the crminal justice system ... [is the] accurrate determination of guil and innocence.").
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of prejudice. It might also induce prosecutors to be more patient in
commencing trials to allow sufficient time for the proper regulation
of dosage levels in order to minimize the risk of drug-induced trial
prejudice. Moreover, this burden may not be as difficult for the
prosecution to carry as it might appear. Justice Kennedy expressed
serious doubt that the "extraordinary showing" he proposed could be
made. 73 However, with the willingness on the part of the trial judge
and prosecutor to be flexible and to permit ample opportunity for the
treating psychiatrist to try different medications and to regulate dose
levels to minimize adverse side effects, this showing may not be as
burdensome as Justice Kennedy supposed.
D. Disposition of Defendants who are Competent on Medication
but for Whom Drug Side Effects are Predicted to Cause Prejudice
at Trial
If the "extraordinary showing" proposed by Justice Kennedy
is required and the trial court finds that there is a serious risk of
drug-induced trial prejudice, he would honor the defendant's asserted
right to discontinue the medication even though this would prevent
the state from bringing him to trial. 74 Thus the question remains of
what would be done with defendants who seem likely to suffer
substantial prejudice if tried on medication. Unlike those defendants
discussed above who will revert to an incompetent state after
termination of medication, 75 these defendants remain competent,
unless drug discontinuation produces a change in their condition, 76
with the result that continued incompetency commitment would seem
inappropriate. The trial court has just determined that these
defendants, even though restored to competency by medication, may
not stand trial because of the prediction that the effects of their
medication would produce trial prejudice. As a result, there would
'?' Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1818 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
174 Id. at 1817.
'75 See supra part III.B.
176 Should drug termination render these defendants incompetent to stand trial, as it
will for many, they will be treated in accordance with the analysis set forth supra part
III.B.
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appear to be no reason to recommit them to a hospital for further
competency treatment. Although they may continue to need
treatment, they are competent to stand trial. Moreover, they have
been determined to have the right to refuse medication. In addition,
treatment other than medication has presumably already been found
to be unsuccessful for these defendants or has been predicted to be
unlikely to succeed as part of the determination that other means less
intrusive than medication could not insure continued competency.
Unless a basis for predicting a different result existed, a resumption
of drug treatment, even if permissible, would seem futile since it
would presumably produce the identical side effects that so recently
presented an unacceptable risk of trial prejudice.
As with those in the category of defendants for whom drug
discontinuation resulted in a resumption of incompetency, these
defendants would be subject to civil commitment under the state's
civil commitment statute. 177 Because they continue to be mentally ill,
they may be hospitalized if they meet the commitment criteria. If
they do not, however, the due process principle applied in Jackson
v. Indiana,17' and more recently in Foucha v. Louisiana,1 79 would
require their release.
These defendants, whether in the hospital or in the
community, will be subject to continued monitoring by the court to
determine whether any change has occurred that would warrant their
return for trial. If their condition improves to the point that they are
competent without medication, their trial could then be resumed. The
delay in bringing them to trial attributable to their election to
terminate medication necessary to maintain their competency would
not raise speedy trial problems.180
The number of defendants for whom the prosecution will be
unable to make the "extraordinary showing" suggested by Justice
Kennedy will probably be very small. In practice, if drug side effects
seem likely to significantly impair the defendant's demeanor at trial
or his ability to communicate with counsel or participate in the
'77 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
1 406 U.S. 715 (1972). See supra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
179 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992). See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
's 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (1988) (trial delay caused by defendant's incompetence is
excludable in computing time under speedy trial act).
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proceedings, trial judges will probably decide that they are
incompetent to stand trial. If antipsychotic treatment has not restored
them to a sufficient level of functioning so that they can participate
in a trial without significant impairment produced by the medication
itself, then they arguably still remain incompetent. Thus although a
theoretical category of competent defendants may exist for whom the
risk of drug-induced trial prejudice is unacceptably high, in practice
these defendants are likely to be found incompetent to stand trial.
Trial judges and other participants in the criminal process know how
to handle defendants found incompetent to stand trial. Because it will
be unclear how the criminal justice system should treat this new
category of defendants, however, trial judges will probably find it
easier simply to shoe-horn them into the familiar incompetency-to-
stand-trial category.
Moreover, the open question of whether to adopt Justice
Kennedy's proposal for an additional "extraordinary showing" will
cause trial judges considerable discomfort, predictably making them
wish they could avoid resolution of this difficult issue altogether. On
the other hand, finding the defendant before them incompetent as a
result of the medication's side effects will allow the judges to side
step this issue entirely.181 If viewed as incompetent to stand trial,
these defendants probably will soon be placed in the subcategory of
incompetent defendants who are permanently incompetent or for
whom restoration to competency seems unlikely to occur within a
foreseeable period dealt with in Jackson v. Indiana."2 Although
some of these defendants will be released, most will be civilly
l Avoidance of the issue would seem likely as a result of a form of the
psychological principle of cognitive dissonance. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF
COONIVE DISSONANCE (1957); JACK W. BREHM & ARTHUR R. COHEN,
EXPLORATIONS IN COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1962); Bruce J. Winick, Harnessing the
Power of the Bet: Wagering with the Government as a Mechanism for Social and
Individual Change, 45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 737, 763 (1991). Under the cognitive
dissonance theory, individuals tend to reinterpret information or experiences that conflict
with their internally accepted or publicly stated beliefs in order to avoid the unpleasant
personal state that such inconsistencies produce. Id. The psychological discomfort
produced by the need to resolve the difficult issue raised in Justice Kennedy's
concurrence, for similar reasons, will make it likely that trial judges will seek to avoid
the issue by invoking the customary incompetency adjudication. See Riggins, 112 S. Ct.
at 1817 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
"1435 U.S. 975 (1978).
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committed. Whether committed or released, however, charges
pending against them are rarely dismissed, and trial may be resumed
if they should regain competency in the future.183
Defendants placed in this subcategory of incompetent
defendants thought unlikely to regain their competency are thus
caught in an unhappy legal limbo: Although they cannot be tried,
their criminal charges continue to remain unresolved and will be
revived if and when they become competent.1  This possibility
provides a strong disincentive to their successful response to
treatment. This can be seen as an example of what therapeutic
jurisprudence terminology calls a "law-related psychological
dysfunction. "185
E. May a Defendant Waive his Due Process Rights under Pate
v. Robinson and Elect to Stand Trial in an Unmedicated State?
One way out of this dysfunctional legal limbo is discussed but
rejected in Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion.18 6  May such a
defendant, who has a due process right to avoid being tried while
incompetent, elect to waive that right and either plead guilty or stand
trial in an impaired state, thereby effectuating a disposition of his
criminal charges? Justice Kennedy dismissed this possibility,
suggesting that such waiver "would not withstand scrutiny under the
18 See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
18 See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
IS See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health Into Mental Health Law:
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 5; Wexler & Winick, The Potential
of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 226; Wexler & Winick, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence as a New Approach, supra note 1, at 994. Although Riggins is subject
to the criticism that it produces this law-related psychological dysfunction, this problem
is more a function of Jackson than of Riggins. In any event, some legal rules-including
Riggins and Jackson-are justifiable based on constitutional or other justice concerns
even if they produce anti-therapeutic effects. See David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick,
in ESSAYS supra note 1, at 313 n.23; Bruce J. Winick, Competency to be Executed: A
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective, 10 BEHAVIORAL SC. & L. 317, 336 n.134
(1992).
' s Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1817 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating defendant's waiver
of the right not to stand trial while incompetent "would not withstand scrutiny under the
Due Process Clause.").
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Due Process Clause, given our holdings in Pate and Drope."187
Thus, in Justice Kennedy's view, even though some defendants may
find it advantageous to waive their due process right and resolve their
criminal charges through either a guilty plea or a trial occurring while
they are in an unmedicated and impaired state, the Constitution
forbids their doing so. 18
In previous articles, I have criticized the notion that this due
process right is non-waivable.1 89 I have argued that the "holdings"
of Pate and Drope are actually dicta, and that there are good reasons
to discard this dicta, at least in cases in which defendants, with the
agreement of their counsel, wish voluntarily to plead guilty or stand
trial notwithstanding their mental impairment.t 0 Whatever the merits
of my arguments in the context of defendants who are of dubious
competence at the time they wish to waive their rights, the arguments
in favor of the ability of defendants to waive rights seem particularly
strong in the context discussed by Justice Kennedy. If a defendant,
like Riggins, who has been restored to competency through the use
of psychotropic medication, wishes to discontinue his medication and
stand trial in his unmedicated state, he is seeking to make that
election at a point when he is competent. Although there may be
serious reasons to question whether incompetent people should be
permitted to waive rights, there should be no similar concern when
the individual seeking to waive his rights is competent at the time.
Indeed, the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 9 approved such a waiver in
principle.I92 In that case, the Court recognized an individual's
constitutionally protected liberty interest in making her own treatment
decisions, which includes the right to decline treatment.'93 The
Court's opinion suggests that, as long as the patient makes her
87 Id. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
'u Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1817.
'W Winiek, supra note 88, at 924-25; Winick, supra note 86, at 245.
o Winick, supra note 86, at 272.
19' 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (upholding Missouri statute requiring clear and convincing
evidence of an incompetent patient's previously expressed directive concerning
withdrawal of life sustaining treatment).
112 Id. at 278.
19 id.
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election clear, she may, while in a competent state, choose in advance
to decline treatment during a future period of incompetency. 1"'
Although finding that the patient in Cruzan had not effected such an
election with sufficient clarity to satisfy the constitutionally
permissible requirements of state law, the Court suggested that her
right to make such a future determination would be honored if
exercised with such clarity."'5 At the time the case was brought, the
patient was in a persistent vegetative state, and hence was
incompetent. "9 The Court's language, however, approved in
principle the possibility that an individual, while in a competent state,
could elect, by living will or other advance directive, to discontinue
future life-sustaining treatment or nourishment should she enter such
a persistent vegetative state in the future.197
Thus, contrary to Justice Kennedy's observation, the
possibility of waiver should be similarly available to a defendant in
the situation presented in Riggins.198 Such a defendant should be
permitted to waive his rights under Pate if he satisfies the following
condition: During a competent state and in consultation with counsel,
he should be required to express a decision that even though
termination of medication may seriously impair his ability to
understand and participate in his criminal trial, he would rather
assume that risk and resolve his charges than be compelled to
continue on medication.1  The waiver option may well indeed be the
'9 Id. at 284-86.
Id.
' See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 272.
I d. at 290-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'"See State v. Hayes, 389 A.2d 1379 (N.H. 1978) (approving the possibility of such
future waivers). See also Winick, supra note 13, at 814 (arguing that such future waiver
should be permissible).
" The defendant should not, however, be permitted to assume the risk that
termination of medication will cause him to act disruptively during trial. If the
defendant's behavior off medication seriously disrupts the decorum of the court room,
a compelling governmental interest in preserving the dignity of the trial process would
be frustrated. See Winick, supra note 88, at 953-54. See, e.g., Hamm v. Jabe, 706
F.2d 765, 768 (6th Cir. 1983) (mistrial appropriate when defendant's condition had
deteriorated and he became disruptive at trial). This risk should not, however, justify
a rejection of the defendant's waiver. Rather, waiver should be at least provisionally
honored and the trial commenced. If disruptive behavior not controllable by other means
should occur, the trial judge could then declare a mistrial. See Winick, supra note 88,
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most reasonable alternative where the side effects of medication
adversely effect the defendant's demeanor and ability to participate in
the proceedings to the extent that his trial is indefinitely postponed.2"
Such a defendant concededly may face two unhappy choices. It may
be better, however, to allow him, while in a competent state, to make
the choice for himself, rather than imposing it upon him by reading
the Constitution to prohibit him from making the decision.
IV. The Impact of Riggins on the Right to Refuse Treatment
A. The Supreme Court's Prior Cases Dealing with the Right to
Refuse Antipsychotic Medication
Aside from its implications for the competency-to-stand-trial
process, the Court's decision in Riggins has enormous consequences
for the developing right to refuse treatment. Riggins was the fourth
occasion in which the Court considered the perplexing questions
raised by the involuntary administration of antipsychotic
medication." 1 In Mills v. Rogers,2" the Court granted certiorari to
consider the involuntary use of such medication for civil patients
treated at the Boston State Hospital, which had been the subject of a
broad remedial order by the district court that had been largely
affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. °3 After briefing and
oral argument, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for
at 959.
0 Such an election may be especially sensible in cases in which the defendant's
participation in the defense is minimal. When the defendant will not testify and his
counsel plans to defend by questioning whether the prosecution has carried its burden
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant's impairment at trial may not affect
the outcome. Similarly, when the defense is technical-based on a pretrial suppression
motion, denial of speedy trial, double jeopardy, or a defect in the indictment-the
defendant's impairment may not matter. Moreover, in cases like Riggins, where the
defendant seeks to raise an insanity defense, his impairment-by allowing the jury to
observe him in the state he was in at the time of the crime rather than in an artificially
calm medicated state-may actually be beneficial.
201 See supra text accompanying notes 5-8.
457 U.S. 291 (1982).
Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
vacated and remanded, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980).
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reconsideration in light of an intervening decision by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognizing a right to refuse
medication on state law grounds. °4 In its brief opinion, however, the
Court noted that by their nature these drugs affect mental processes,
and, without deciding the question, expressed its assumption that their
involuntary administration intruded upon a liberty interest protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. °5
In Rennie v. Klein ,2° a parallel case challenging medication
practices in New Jersey state hospitals which arose in the same period
as Rogers, the Court vacated the decision of the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals. 20 7 The Court's brief order vacated the Third Circuit's
opinion recognizing a right of state hospital patients to refuse
antipsychotic medication, and called for reconsideration in light of the
Court's 1982 decision in Youngberg v. Romeo, 2 8 another Third
Circuit case that had challenged conditions and practices at an
institution for those suffering from mental retardation. Youngberg
had applied a deferential professional judgment standard, 21 and the
Court's remand in Rennie implied that the professional judgment
standard might be applicable in the right to refuse treatment context
also. 2
10
The Court addressed these issues again in 1990 in
Washington v. Harper,211 granting certiorari to consider a decision of
the Supreme Court of Washington that had placed substantive and
procedural due process limitations on the ability of a state prison to
use antipsychotic medication involuntarily to treat a prisoner found to
2'4 Mills, 457 U.S. at 306.
Id. at 298-99.
458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
7 Id.
' 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (holding mentally ill individual involuntarily committed to
a state hospital has constitutionally protected liberty interests under the Fourteenth
Amendmentto reasonably safe conditions of confimement and freedom from unreasonable
bodily restraint).
2" Id. at 321.
210 Rennie, 720 F.2d at 269.
211 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (treating of prisoner against his will did not violate due
process where prisoner was found to be dangerous to himself or others and where
treatment was in prisoner's best interest).
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be dangerous when not on such medication.21 At oral argument, the
justices seemed disturbed by the question before them: Could a prison
forcibly administer antipsychotic medication to a prisoner determined
to be mentally ill and dangerous to himself and others by a prison
review board?213 At one level, the answer may have seemed clear.
The prisoner was concededly mentally ill, had a history of being
assaultive, and had been prescribed the drugs by his prison
psychiatrist subject to the approval of a security hospital review board
under a regulation limiting forced medication to the need to prevent
danger to the prisoner, other inmates, or prison staff.2
14
The Washington Supreme Court had found such involuntary
medication to be unconstitutional absent a judicial determination that
the prisoner was mentally ill and dangerous and that the treatment
was the least intrusive method of dealing with the problem.215 The
briefs submitted to the Supreme Court mainly focussed on whether
procedural due process required a judicial hearing rather than the
administrative hearing authorized by the Washington statute.216
Although several courts had required a judicial hearing before
involuntary antipsychotic medication could be authorized,217 most had
accepted the more informal administrative determination of the
issue.218 In addition, the Court's approach in Parham v. J.R.,219
212 Id. at 218. See Harper v. Harper, 759 P.2d 358 (Wash. 1988).
213 Harper, 494 U.S. at 213.
214 Id. at 214-17.
215 Harper, 759 P.2d at 364-65.
216 Brief of Petitioner at 8-12, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No. 88-
599); Brief of Respondent at 15-43, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (No.
88-599).
217 See Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub
nom. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Riese v. St. Mary's Hosp. & Medical Ctr.,
243 Cal. Rptr. 241 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986);
Winick, supra note 114, at 21-26.
218 See Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 850 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated and
remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982); United States v. Leatherman, 580 F. Supp. 977, 980
(D.D.C. 1983) ("[Djue process does not require a court hearing to determine the issue
of competency to refuse treatment with psychotropic drugs if hospital procedures employ
sufficient safeguards and if, as here, there is no suggestion that the hospital treatment
decision offends accepted medical practice."); Winick, supra note 114, at 23-26.
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approving an administrative review for the civil commitment of
children by their parents, had expressed the Court's distaste for
requiring a judicial model as a matter of due process for the
resolution of issues requiring clinical judgment and prediction as
opposed to determinations of historical questions of fact.22 It,
therefore, seemed predictable that the Court would reverse. The
justices, however, still seemed disturbed about the effects of the
drugs.22 Although the American Psychiatric Association submitted
an amicus brief in support of the prison, defending the use of these
drugs and seeking to minimize their risks,222 the American
Psychological Association filed an amicus brief in support of the
prisoner, which emphasized the serious side effects the drugs
produce.223
Justice Kennedy, in particular, seemed to express concern in
his questioning, prompting some of those attending the argument to
speculate that he was a potential vote for the prisoner. 2  Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor were moving toward the vacuum created at
the center of the Court with the retirement of Justice Powell, whom
Justice Kennedy had replaced, and at least one of their votes seemed
essential if the prisoner was to win. As they left the Court at the
conclusion of oral argument, representatives of the American
Psychiatric Association seemed concerned about the direction of the
questioning and uncertain about the result.225
The opinion was assigned to Justice Kennedy. The Court
upheld the prison practice, reversing the decision of the Washington
219 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (admitting a child for treatment to a state mental hospital at
the request of his or her parents does not violate the child's rights where review was
performed by An independent clinician at admission).
o Id. at 606-09. ("[D]ue process is not violated by use of informal, traditional
medical investigative techniques.").
221 Harper, 494 U.S. at 230.
m See Brief of the American Psychiatric Association and the Washington State
Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990)
(No. 88-599).
223 See Brief of the American Psychological Association as Amicus Curiae,
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (88-599).
1 See Arguments Before the Court: Prisons and Jails, 58 U.S.L.W. 3268 (1989)
(reviewing oral argument before the Court in Harper).
I I attended the oral argument and this was my personal observation.
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Supreme Court.22 6 Writing for five of the justices, Justice Kennedy
discussed both the substantive due process and the procedural due
process issues raised.227 The Court recognized that the involuntary
use of antipsychotic drugs involved a serious intrusion on what it
characterized as the individual's "significant liberty interest. 1228 By
adopting a deferential approach to reviewing the discretion of prison
authorities in dealing with the perplexing problems of institutional
security, however, the Court upheld the involuntary administration of
the drugs in the circumstances presented.229 The Court applied the
limited scope of review developed in prior prison cases, under which
invasion of constitutional rights pursuant to prison regulations could
be justified if reasonably related to a legitimate penalogical
objective. 230  The Court also rejected the "least restrictive means"
analysis of the Washington Supreme Court.23 Finally, the Court
upheld the sufficiency of the administrative model authorized by the
Washington regulation, rejecting the contention that procedural due
process required a judicial determination of the need for
medication.232 Justice Blackmun wrote a short concurring opinion,"
and Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. 34
Was Harper just a prison case, or did the approach to
involuntary antipsychotic medication used by the Court apply more
generally to medication practices in civil mental hospitals and other
226 Harper, 494 U.S. at 236.
227 Id. at 219-36.
m Id. at 221.
229 Id. at 233-34.
I d. at 223 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1982)).
2' Harper, 494 U.S at 225 ("Mhe absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the
reasonableness of a prison regulation, but this does not mean that prison officials 'have
to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating
the claimant's constitutional complaint."') (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91).
212 Id. at 228.
3 Id. at 236 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (adding a caveat which recommends
commitment of mentally ill patients when indications of incompetency are present).
234 Id. at 237 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (reasoning that
liberty interest in refusing unwanted antispychotic medication is a fundamental right
requiring the highest order of constitutional protection and should not be compromised
in the absence of a compelling state interest).
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settings? The Court's deferential approach in Harper was far from
the strict scrutiny applied by the Washington Supreme Court. The
protection of the safety of other prisoners and prison staff was
undoubtedly a compelling state interest, but the prisoner in Harper
had argued that the State could accomplish this objective by less
intrusive means, such as segregation or prison discipline.2"' The
Court expressly rejected this least restrictive alternative approach,
noting that the Constitution did not require prison authorities to
consider and reject each of a number of conceivable responses to the
problem of institutional security it faced.236 Yet the Court in Harper
characterized its standard of review as more than merely a rational
basis test.237 There must be, the Court held, a "reasonable," not
merely rational, relationship to a legitimate penalogical purpose. 23 1
In the course of its discussion, the Court also mentioned that
the record in Harper reflected the fact that the medication prescribed
was in the prisoner's medical interests. 239 Although referring to this
finding in its statement of the conditions that would justify forced
medication, the prison regulation in Harper setting forth standards for
involuntary medication had not required this finding," ° and the
... See id. at 226-27.
6 Harper, 494 U.S. at 225.
237 Id. at 224.
2 3 Id. at 223.
239 Id. at 222-23. ("Mhe fact that the medication must first be prescribed by a
psychiatrist, and then approved by a reviewing psychiatrist, ensures that the treatment
in question will be ordered only if it is in the prisoner's medical interests given the
legitimate needs of his institutional confinement."). See also Harper, 494 U.S. at 223
n.8 ("We therefore agree with the State's representations at oral argument that, under
the Policy, anti-psychotic medications can be administered only for treatment purposes,
with the hearing committee reviewing the doctor's decision to ensure what has been
prescribed is appropriate.").
240 Id. at 215 (discussing Washington Department of Corrections Special Offender
Center Policy 600.30). Justice Stevens pointed out this discrepancy:
Policy 600.30 permits forced administration of psychotropic drugs
on a mentally ill inmate based purely on the impact that his disorder
has on the security of the prison environment. The provisions of the
Policy make no reference to any expected benefit on the inmate's
mental condition. . . . Although any application of Policy 600.30
requires a medical judgment as to a prisoner's medical condition and
the cause of his behavior, the Policy does not require a determination
that forced medication would advance his medical interest . -
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precedential effect of the Court's reference to the medical
appropriateness of the medication administered remained unclear.
Was the requirement that medication be medically appropriate an
element of the Court's constitutional standard, or merely a factor
contained in the record that allowed the Court to feel more
comfortable about its decision? Finally, did the Court's rejection of
a judicial determination of the appropriateness of forced drugging
mean that informal administrative models for such determinations
would be approved in other contexts? Although these questions were
left unresolved in Harper, the Court's decision reflected what seemed
to be a narrow view of the emerging right to refuse intrusive
treatment.
That the Harper approach might be applied to right to refuse
treatment issues arising in contexts not involving prison security
seemed likely as a result of the Court's decision in Perry v.
Louisiana.241 In Perry, the Court granted certiorari to consider the
right of a death row inmate found incompetent for execution to refuse
antipsychotic medication.242 The prisoner asserted a right to refuse
treatment after the State attempted to treat him with drugs in order to
restore him to competency so that he could be executed. 243 After oral
argument, the Court vacated the State court's decision ordering
forced medication for reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court's
recent ruling in Harper.2' The implication seemed to be that Harper
supplied the appropriate standard for resolving this and perhaps other
right to refuse treatment questions.
Thus, most unfortunately, there is simply no basis for the Court's
assertion that medication under the Policy must be to advance the
prisoner's medical interest.
Id. at 243-45 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
4' 498 U.S. 38 (1991) (judgment vacated and case remanded for further
consideration in light of Harper).
242 494 U.S. 1015 (1990).
' State v. Perry, 543 So.2d 487 (La. 1989). See State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746,
747 (La. 1992) (on remand).
' Perry, 498 U.S. 38 (1990). See Winick, supra note 185, at 328-37 (analyzing
issues left unresolved in Perry). On remand, the Louisiana Supreme Court found Harper
distinguishable and held that involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs for
restoring a defendant to competency for execution violated the State and Federal
Constitutions. Perry, 610 So.2d at 751.
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B. The New Approach of Riggins
Riggins dispels the implication that Harper should be given a
broad construction. Indeed, in its opinion in Riggins, the Court
moves strongly in the opposite direction, suggesting that the right to
refuse treatment will be given a considerably more generous reading
outside the prison context."4 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in
Riggins quoted liberally from Harper's description of the serious side
effects of antipsychotic drugs, the involuntary administration of
which, she reiterated, "represents a substantial interference" with
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. 2' Indeed, she pointed
out that in the case of an antipsychotic drug like Mellaril, the same
drug that had been involved in Harper, "that interference is
particularly severe . ,,247
The first hint that the deferential approach of Harper would
not be applied in Riggins came in Justice O'Connor's use of the word
"unique" to describe the "circumstances of penal confinement" that
had provided the context for Harper.248 The Court then made clear
that the medical appropriateness of the medication administered to the
prisoner in Harper was a constitutional requirement for such
involuntary treatment.24 9 The Court restated its holding in Harper as
being that "forcing antipsychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner is
impermissible absent a finding of overriding justification and a
determination of medical appropriateness."s° In doing so, the Court
245 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
2 Id. at 1814 (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 229).
77 Id.
24 Id. at 1815.
24 Id.
210 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815. The constitutional requirement of medical appro-
priateness parallels a similar requirement of medical ethics. See Harper, 494 U.S. at
222 n.8; id. at 245 n.li (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); State v.
Perry, 610 So.2d 746, 751 (La. 1992). The Hippocratic Oath, which is at the core of
medical ethics, imposes a duty of benevolence and of non-malevolence on the physician
that is inconsistent with the administration of treatment that is not in the patient's best
interests. The Oath provides:
I swear by Apollo the physician, by Aesculapius, Hygeia, and
Panacea, and I take to witness all the gods, all the goddesses, to
keep according to my ability and my judgment the following Oath:
[1] will prescribe regimen for the good of my patients according to
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elevated to a constitutional prerequisite for involuntary medication the
requirement that such medication be shown to be medically
appropriate for the patient.
Riggins, of course, was not a convicted prisoner at the time
he was involuntarily medicated; rather, he was in jail awaiting trial.
Accordingly, the Court noted that when compared with convicted
prisoners, the Fourteenth Amendment "affords at least as much
protection to persons the State detains for trial."25' That the Court
would in fact apply a more stringent standard of review to the
practices at issue in Riggins was signaled by the Court's quoting from
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz252 that prison regulations "are judged
under a 'reasonableness' test less restrictive than that ordinarily
applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional
rights. "253
The Court then adapted the Harper standard to the pretrial
setting of Riggins, indicating that the State would "certainly" have
satisfied due process "if the prosecution had demonstrated and the
District Court had found that treatment with antipsychotic medication
was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives,
essential for the sake of Riggins' own safety or the safety of
others. "' In this one sentence, the Court appeared to broaden the
Harper approach in two significant respects. Whereas Harper had
explicitly rejected a less restrictive alternative test, 255 the Riggins
my ability and my judgment and never do harm to anyone. To
please no one will I prescribe a deadly drug, nor give advice which
may cause his death .... I will preserve the purity of my life and
my art .... In every house where I come I will enter only for the
good of my patients, keeping myself far from all intentional
ill-doing....
Id. (quoting Hippocrates c. 460-400 B.C., STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 647 (4th
Unabridged Lawyer's Ed. 1976). See also Winick, supra note 185, at 332.
2s Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
22 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (holding policies reasonably related to legitimate penalogical
interests do not offend Free Exercise Clause).
253 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815 (quoting O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349) ("[P]rison
regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged under a 'reasonableness'
test less restricti"e than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental
constitutional rights.").
M id.
2" See id.
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Court applied such a test in the pretrial context before it. 5 6  In
addition, although Harper had rejected the necessity of a judicial
determination of the need for involuntary medication, Riggins
specifically required that the trial court itself make these necessary
findings.57 Although the Court did not specify the standard of proof
the prosecution would need to meet when making such a necessary
demonstration, its citation of Addington v. Texas,255 in which the
Court had held that due process conditions civil commitment on the
state's showing by clear and convincing evidence that hospitalization
is warranted, suggests that the Riggins Court may have contemplated
a similar heightened standard of proof within the pretrial involuntary
medication context.25 9
The Court in Riggins next considered an additional potential
justification for involuntary medication in the pretrial setting. The
Court suggested that the State might have been able to justify such
medication "by establishing that it could not obtain an adjudication of
Riggins' guilt or innocence by using less intrusive means. ,,260 In its
description of this potential justification for involuntary medication,
as in its formulation of its first suggested justification, the Court once
again invoked the less intrusive alternative principle that the Court
previously had rejected in the prison context of Harper.261
The majority in Riggins took issue with Justice Thomas'
suggestion in his dissenting opinion that the Court was adopting a
2 Id.
25' Id. It may be difficult to infer from Riggins' adoption of a judicial model for
right to refuse treatment issues in the criminal trial process that judicial models also will
be required in other right to refuse treatment contexts. Within Riggins' trial context, a
trial judge already is involved with the matter and would need to deal with the criminal
law aspects of the case, including competency to stand trial. As a result, it would not
have been sensible for the Court to have bifurcated the medication question by involving
an administrative decisionmaker. Thus, allowing the court, which is already and
inevitably involved with the matter, to resolve the right to refuse treatment issues arising
in the criminal trial process does not necessarily indicate a broad rejection of Harper's
endorsement of an administrative model for right to refuse decisionmaking. As a result,
in other contexts, Harper's preference for administrative decisionmaking would still
seem applicable.
2 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
259 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
260 Id.
21 Id.
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standard of strict scrutiny.262 In response to this criticism, the Court
stated that it had "no occasion to finally prescribe such substantive
standards since the District Court allowed administration of Mellaril
to continue without making any determination of the need for this
course or any findings about reasonable alternatives. "2 63 Although the
Court did not definitively prescribe any standard, its suggestions
amounted to a standard of strict scrutiny. 2 '  As dicta, the Court's
suggested standards were neither "adopted" nor finally prescribed.265
The Court's references to plainly compelling state objectives as well
to the requirement that a state may administer drugs involuntarily
only if less intrusive means would not suffice suggest that strict
scrutiny was precisely what the majority had in mind.2"
Strict scrutiny may be particularly appropriate in the criminal
pretrial and trial context presented in Riggins. When an individual
accused of a crime is involuntarily medicated, his due process liberty
interest in being free of the substantial intrusion of unwanted
treatment is coupled with his due process interests in a fair trial and
in controlling his own defense. A criminal defendant's right to
control his defense is itself a fundamental constitutional right,
2 Id. (citing id. at 1826) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
2 Id. at 1815-16.
1" The Court majority in Riggins specifically eschews adopting a
standard of strict scrutiny, not because the majority disagrees with
such a standard, but because the majority has "no occasion to finally
prescribe such substantive standards." The Court's reasoning and
language, however-e.g., its focus on the Nevada court's failure to
indicate whether "compelling [state] concerns outweighed Riggins'
interest in freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs," virtually
announces that the compelling state interest test applies.
Khiem v. United States, 612 A.2d 160, 178 n.5 (D.C. App. 1992) (Ferren, J., voting
to grant rehearing en banc) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). See Woodland
v. Angus, 820 F. Supp. 1497, 1510 (D. Utah) (construing Riggins to require strict
scrutiny).
20 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1816.
26 Id. at 1815-16. Compelling state objectives discussed by the Court included
protection for the safety of inmates and institutional staff and the need to maintain a
criminal defendant in a competent state so that he or she may be tried. Id.
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intrusions on which warrant heightened scrutiny.267 Thus, involuntary
administration of medication resulting in side effects which impair the
defendant's ability in this regard is deserving of considerably more
demanding judicial review than the reasonableness standard applied
in Harper and in other prison cases. Even apart from this added
consideration unique to involuntary medication in the criminal trial
context, the intrusions on bodily privacy and mental processes
produced by these drugs make strict constitutional scrutiny
appropriate whenever they are sought to be forcibly administered,
with the possible exception of the prison. Although Riggins does not
explore the nature of the liberty interest invaded, the intrusions
caused by these drugs are sufficiently serious that the liberty interest
in avoiding them should be considered fundamental. Involuntary
medication invades an individual's "historic liberty interest" in
"personal security" and bodily integrity. -65 Moreover, the liberty
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause includes protection for
individual autonomy to make important choices, including personal
See Robert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emerging Constitu-
tional Guaranty in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REv. 713, 799 (1976); Fentiman, supra
note 135, at 1120; Winick, supra note 165, at 1748-49; see also Rock v. Arkansas, 483
U.S. 44, 52 (1987) ("Even more fundamental to personal defense . . . is an accused's
right to present his own version of events in his own words."); Crane v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 683, 690-91 (1986) ("Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense."); Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91
(1975) (stating that a conflict between defendant's right to consult with his attorney and
the prosecution's right to cross-examine the defendant without intervention of counsel
must, under the Sixth Amendment, be resolved in favor of the right to the assistance and
guidance of counsel); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (discussingright of the
accused to present his own defense without assistance of counsel); Brooks v. Tennessee,
406 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1972) ("mhe accused and his counsel may not be restricted in
deciding whether and when in the course of presenting his defense, the accused should
take the stand."); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S, 14, 19 (1967) (stating the right to
present a defense is a fundamental element of due process of law).
' See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (stating that historical liberties
include the right to be free from "unjustified intrusions on personal security"); Union
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 252 (1891) ("No right is held more sacred, or
is more carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possessions and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."); Winick, supra note 165,
at 1733 & n.120. Cf. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (applying Fourth Amend-
ment safeguard of reasonableness to involuntary surgery to remove bullet from body of
accused for use as evidence of guilt).
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health decisions.2 9 The Court in Cruzan, its 1990 "right to die"
case, expressed its assumption that such liberty protected an
individual's decision "in refusing medical treatment." 270 In a
concurring opinion in that case, Justice O'Connor noted that "our
notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical
freedom and self-determination. ' 271 Not only does the serious
physical intrusion of antipsychotic medication invade this liberty
interest, but it also infringes First Amendment values. 272  As the
Court recognized in both Riggins and Harper, these drugs "alter the
chemical balance in the patient's brain," producing "changes . .. in
his or her cognitive processes. ",273 Moreover, as Justice Kennedy
noted in his lengthy description of the adverse side effects in his
concurring opinion in Riggins, these drugs may be sedating and may
interfere with concentration in ways that diminish the defendant's
ability to understand and follow the proceedings, and may directly
affect verbal and nonverbal communication, including speech itself.274
The Court has never been presented with the opportunity to consider
the First Amendment implications of involuntary administration of
these drugs, 275 but the drugs' serious and direct intrusion on mental
269 See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990);
Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (noting that
"[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body."); Winick, supra note 165, at 1732-37.
0 Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278.
27 Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
272 See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1393-94 (10th Cir. 1984) ("The First
Amendment protects the communication of ideas, which itself implies protection of the
capacity to produce ideas."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985); Winick, supra note
113, at 63-90.
2 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814 (quoting Harper, 494 U.S. at 229-30).
"7 Id. at 1819-20 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
I's No First Amendment claim was asserted in either Harper or Riggins. Justice
Stevens' opinion in Harper noted that the First Amendment implication of the use of
these drugs was not before the Court. Harper, 494 U.S. at 258 n.32 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). A 10th Circuit Court of Appeals decision
applied First Amendment limits on the involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs,
but the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari seeking review of the issue. Bee,
744 F.2d at 1394 (basing its decision on a finding that antipsychotic drugs have the
capacity to severely affect an individual's ability to think and communicate), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985).
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processes and effects on cognitive and communicative ability make
the strict scrutiny traditionally applied in the First Amendment
context appropriate.276
As a result, even though the criminal due process concern
presented in Riggins may be absent in forcible medication contexts
outside of the criminal process, the nature of the intrusion on liberty
alone would justify strict scrutiny of the justifications for such
unwanted treatment. Although Riggins does not address whether its
strict scrutiny approach would apply more generally, its analysis
should extend beyond the criminal trial context within which the case
arose. Indeed, the Court's apparent confinement of the more
deferential reasonableness approach it had used in Harper to the
"unique circumstances of penal confinement," 277 suggests that the
more demanding scrutiny of Riggins may emerge as the general
standard applied in this area.
It thus now appears that the deferential approach applied in
Harper will be limited to prison contexts in which the asserted
justification for involuntary medication relates to the prison's need to
maintain institutional security. Riggins shows that even in an
institution similar to a prison, such as a jail, the need to protect
institutional security will not justify application of the deferential
standard used in Harper for scrutinizing involuntary medication.2 71
Even when the need to protect individual security in the jail is the
justification for administration of medication, a more generous
standard of constitutional review will be used. 279  The Riggins
standard, expressed in the language of traditional strict scrutiny,
contrasts sharply with Harper's standard, which merely requires that
the treatment imposed be reasonably related to a legitimate
penalogical interest.28 ° The need to protect other inmates or staff
from physical danger would count as a compelling governmental
interest in any setting. 28' The Court in Harper explicitly rejected the
276 Winick, supra note 114, at 63-90.
27n Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815.
2n Id.
2W Id.
no Id. at 1815-16.
n' See id. at 1816 (classifying "security considerations" as "compelling"). Winick,
supra note 114, at 93-94.
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requirement that forced medication could be used only when no less
intrusive means for accomplishing this interest existed, but suggested
in Riggins that this standard would apply if protection of safety in the
jail had been the asserted justification for medication.282
If the "less intrusive means" standard would apply even in a
jail, then it seems likely that it would also be applied in mental
hospital contexts. Mental hospitals cannot be equated with prisons.
Unlike prisons, hospitals are not filled with inmates who have been
convicted of committing crimes, many of which are crimes of
violence.283 Many residents of mental hospitals are voluntary patients
who are there because they need treatment and have accepted
hospitalization in order to receive it.2  Many are there who,
although involuntarily committed, have been hospitalized because
their mental illness has rendered them gravely disabled or
incompetent and in need of treatment. 2 5  Although some are
hospitalized involuntarily because of their dangerousness to
themselves or others, hospitals are not the inherently combustible
institutions that prisons are, and a hospital's ability to deal with acute
symptomatology differs significantly from that of a prison. Many
prisons do not have an adequate number of mental health
professionals on staff experienced in dealing with mental patients who
may act out violently while in a florid state of psychosis. 286
Hospitals, on the other hand, have many professional and support
staff with precisely such experience and a variety of alternative
approaches for dealing with problems of violence, such as
segregation, 217 physical restraints, 21' and psychotherapeutic?" and
M Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1814.
253 The prisoner in Harper was housed in the Special Offenders Center (SOC).
Harper v. Washington, 759 P.2d 358, 360 (Wash. 1988) ("The SOC is a 144-bed
correctional institution administered by the Department of Corrections. The SOC was
established to provide diagnosis and treatment of convicted felons having serious
behavioral or mental disorders.").
2I See Winick, supra note 8, at 185 (analyzing voluntary hospitalization).
285 See Winick, supra note 114, at 98 & n.581.
See sources cited supra note 119.
287 See Paul H. Soloff, Physical Controls: The Use of Seclusion and Restraint in
Modern Psychiatric Practice, in CLINICAL TREATMENT OF THE VIOLENT PERSON 119
(Loren H. Roth ed., 1987) [hereinafter Soloff, CLINICAL TREATMENT].
2 See id.
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behavioral techniques. 2 ° Even when medication is required on an
emergency basis to deal with acute symptomatology, a properly
staffed mental hospital should be able to deal with such a problem
with only a brief use of medication.29
Moreover, whatever the approach applied in the mental
hospital, patients and offenders in the community should not be
subjected to involuntary intrusive mental health treatment absent
satisfaction of the more demanding Riggins standard of scrutiny.
Since hospitalization itself can be used for mentally ill individuals in
the community presenting an imminent threat of danger, through
application of the emergency commitment provisions of typical state
commitment statutes,292 the need for involuntary medication in
community contexts should rarely arise. Thus, the exigencies
invoked by the Court in Harper to justify deference in the
administration of medication to control violence in the prison are
simply not present in the community.293
In addition to modifying Harper, the Courts's opinion in
Riggins suggests that the professional judgment standard applied in
Youngberg v. Romeo294 may have limited application within the right
to refuse treatment context. In Youngberg, the Court had recognized
2 9 See, e.g., Denis J. Madden, Psychotherapeutic Approaches in the Treatment of
Violent Persons, in CLINICAL TREATMENT, supra note 287, at 54.
290 See Robert P. Liberman & Stephen E. Wong, Behavior Analysis and Therapy
Procedures Related to Seclusion and Restraint, in THE PSYCHIATRIC USES OF SECLUSION
AND RESTRAINT 35 (Kenneth Tardiff ed., 1984); Stephen E. Wong et al., Behavioral
Analysis and Therapyfor Aggressive Psychiatric and Developmentally Disabled Patients,
in CLINICAL TREATMENT, supra note 287.
291 In limited circumstances, such a brief use of medication to stabilize the patient
may be the most reasonable alternative available to deal with an emergency and would
therefore meet the more demanding scrutiny suggested in Riggins. See Winick, supra
note 114, at 97-99.
292 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.026 (Baldwin 1993) (involuntarily
committing those who are a danger to themselves or others and can benefit from
treatment provided it is the least restrictive alternative); OR. REV. STAT. § 426.175
(1991) (permitting physician to hospitalize individual on belief that individual needs
treatment for mental illness); N.Y. MENTAL HYO. LAW § 9.39 (McKinney 1993)
(allowing director of hospital approved to receive patients under this section to retain
'individuals for 15 days if individual is believed to be dangerous to himself or others).
2 See Winick, supra note 114, at 97.
457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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that residents of an institution for those suffering from mental
retardation had a due process right to be free of unsafe conditions of
confinement and unnecessary physical restraint.295 In discussing the
due process liberty interest in avoiding unnecessary restraint,
however, the Court adopted an approach in which the individual's
liberty interest was limited to the exercise of professional judgment
by institutional staff.2" The Supreme Court subsequently cited
Youngberg in its order vacating the Third Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision in Rennie v. Klein,297 a leading case involving the right of
mental patients at a state hospital to refuse antipsychotic medication.
The Court vacated Rennie for reconsideration in light of its opinion
in Youngberg, thereby raising the implication that the professional
judgment standard applied in Youngberg might apply in the right to
refuse treatment context.298 Indeed, on remand, the Third Circuit
limited its prior opinion by adapting the Youngberg approach to the
state hospital context rather than the least intrusive alternative
approach it had previously applied. 29' Although continuing to
recognize that patients had a due process liberty interest in refusing
antipsychotic medication, the court found that this interest could be
overcome by an exercise of professional judgment on the part of a
' Id. at 324 (stating that the mentally disabled have a constitutionally protected
interest in reasonable care and safety and to reasonably nonrestrictive confinement
conditions).
2 See id. at 323 (stating that liability for violation of this liberty interest would lie
only where "the decision by the professional is such a substantial departure from
accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person
responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment").
2'653 F.2d 836, 844-45 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc) (holding that a "patient has a
constitutional right to be free from treatment that poses substantial risks to his well-
being"), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982).
' See Rennie, 458 U.S. at 1119 (vacating the judgment for further consideration in
light of Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)).
9 Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc). On remand, the
Court of Appeals split several ways concerning applicability of the least restrictive
alternative principle. Of the ten judges participating in the post-remand en banc
decision, five rejected application of the least restrictive alternative principle for at least
short-term administration of drugs. Id. at 270; id. at 271 (Adams, J., concurring). Four
would have applied the principle. Id. at 275-76 (Weis, J., concurring); id. at 277
(Gibbons, J., concurring in opinion of Weis, J., concurring). One of the judges failed
to explicitly discuss the issue. Id. (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
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hospital clinician. 3°° In addition, a number of other lower federal
court decisions similarly applied Youngberg's professional judgment
approach to the right to refuse medication context 1 leading some
commentators to conclude that the right to refuse treatment was
significantly limited. 3"
The Court, however, did not even mention Youngberg in its
opinion in Riggins. This omission seems to suggest that the
Youngberg professional judgment standard may be inapplicable to the
right to refuse medication question. Riggins, after all, had received
the professional judgment of the psychiatrist who had prescribed 800
mg of Mellaril to him prior to and during his trial.30 3 Indeed, several
court-appointed psychiatrists had evaluated Riggins and reported to
the trial court concerning his competency and need for on-going
medication during the trial period. 3" In this way, since the
professional judgment of these clinicians was that the medication
given Riggins was medically appropriate, the professional judgment
standard would seem to have been satisfied. The Court, however,
treated the issue presented in Riggins as a constitutional question
' Rennie, 720 F.2d at 269-70; id. at 274-75 (Seitz, C.J., concurring); id. at 276
(Weis, J., concurring). See 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL § 5.36, at 320 (1989).
"o See United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 312 (4th Cir. 1988) (en bane)
("[L]egally institutionalized mental patient is entitled to the exercise of 'professional
judgment' by those who have responsibility for making medical decisions .... "), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1016 (1990); Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hosp., 827 F.2d 291, 300
(10th Cir. 1984) (upholding a decision made by "professionals exercising their
professional judgment"); Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395-96 (10th Cir. 1984)
("[M]edication with this type of drug requires a professional judgment-call."), cert.
denied, 496 U.S. 1214 (1985); Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 979 (2d Cir.
1983) ("[D]eference must be accorded medical judgment in such matters .... ); R.A.J.
v. Miller, 590 F. Supp. 1319, 1321 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (stating that a decision of a
professional should only be invalidated when it represents a significant departure from
accepted medical practices or standards); United States v. Leatherman, 580 F. Supp.
977, 980 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding professional judgment acceptable provided treatment
decision does not offend accepted medical practice).
I See, e.g., Alexander D. Brooks, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medications:
Law and Policy, 39 RUToERS L. REV. 339, 355 (1987).
3 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812-13.
3N Id.
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requiring a judicial determination, rather than merely a clinical issue
which should be left to professional judgment. 5
Of the Court's suggested standards for justifying involuntary
medication, only the medical appropriateness standard raises a clinical
question that presumably will turn largely on professional judgment.
The other components are legal questions that are committed to
judicial determination under Riggins. Because Riggins' defense
counsel had not challenged the medical appropriateness of the
medication administered, the Supreme Court had no occasion to
discuss the application of the Youngberg professional judgment
standard to the medical appropriateness issue. With regard to the
remaining elements of its suggested standards, however, the Court
plainly contemplated a judicial determination of whether the State's
interests were sufficient to override the defendant's liberty interest in
refusing medication, and whether involuntary medication was the
306least intrusive means of meeting these governmental interests.
Although the professional judgment of clinicians may be relevant to
these essentially legal issues, Riggins clearly suggests that it is not
dispositive.3 °7 Indeed, application of the Youngberg professional
judgment approach to the issues presented in Riggins would have
been an abdication of judicial responsibility for the protection of
constitutional rights. 30 ' The liberty interest involved in Youngberg,
freedom from short-term use of physical restraints, cannot compare
to the more serious and long-lasting intrusion presented by
antipsychotic medication, particularly when administered in the
extremely high dose involved in Riggins. The antipsychotic drugs
intrude more on protected constitutional values than does the brief use
of restraints, and the values affected may be considered more
o5 Id. at 1814 (discussing the precedent set in Harper which established that an
inmate's interest in avoiding involuntary administration of anti-psychotic drugs protected
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause); id. at 1815 (requiring trial
court to make explicit findings justifying involuntary medication).
3M id.
3M7 Id.
' For an analysis of a wide variety of areas in which the Youngberg professional
judgment standard has been applied, and a criticism of this standard as an inappropriate
abdication of judicial responsibility, see Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the
"Experts': From Deference to Abdication Under the Professional Judgment Standard,
102 YALE L.J. 639 (1992).
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fundamental. 3" The restraints involved in Youngberg were "'soft'
restraints for the arms only,"3 10 and were used on the patient "for
short periods of time, i.e., five minutes, to prevent him from harming
himself or others. "311 Moreover, the use of restraints in Youngberg
may have served the patient's best interests 3 1 and he clearly lacked
the capacity to assert a view of his best interests that diverged from
the professional judgment of state physicians.1 3 Romeo was
profoundly retarded, 14 and as a result, was grossly incompetent by
any standard. By contrast, the detainee involved in Riggins had never
been declared mentally incompetent. 15 The Court in Riggins did not
discuss these distinctions, but its failure even to mention Youngberg
suggests limited application of the professional judgment approach
within the right to refuse treatment context. Riggins thus breathes
new life into the right to refuse treatment. Whereas Harper
suggested a narrow scope for the right to refuse mental health
treatment, Riggins moves in the opposite direction. The language in
Justice O'Connor's opinion suggests that the Court will construe the
right to refuse treatment much more broadly in contexts outside the
prison.31 6 Whereas the Court's remand in Rennie suggested the
possibility that the deferential professional judgment standard of
0 See People v. Medina, 705 P.2d 961, 968 (Colo. 1985) ("The effects of these
drugs can be far more debilitating to the patient than ... physical restraints ... .
310 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 310 n.4.
3"Id. at 311 n.8.
312 See id. at 324 (stating that restraints may be used only to assure safety or to
provide needed training).
313 Id. at 322-23.
314 Id. at 309.
3" Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1812. This factor may also tend to distinguish the situation
of hospitalized mental patients, many of whom are not incompetent to participate in
treatment decisions, or in any event have not been determined to be so. The respect for
individual autonomy lying at the heart of the fundamental constitutional values involved
commands at least some deference to the expressed preferences of these patients, even
if of marginal competency. See Winick, supra note 88, at 951-68; see also supra notes
253-60 and accompanying text (analyzing how the Riggins standard is broader than the
Harper standard).
316 Riggins, 112 S. Ct. at 1815 ("Under Harper, forcing antipsychotic drugs on a
convicted prisoner is impermissible absent a finding of overriding justification and a
determination of medical appropriateness. The Fourteenth Amendment affords at least
as much protection to persons the State detains for trial.").
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Youngberg might apply in the right to refuse treatment context, 317
Riggins' failure to cite Youngberg in a context in which it could have
been invoked seems to reject this approach.
C. The Therapeutic Implications of the Court's New Approach
The Riggins discussion of the right to refuse psychotropic
medication in the criminal trial context was based exclusively on
constitutional considerations. Its expansion of the right to refuse
treatment inevitably will have therapeutic consequences for both
patients and the clinicians involved in their treatment. Therapeutic
jurisprudence suggests the need for consideration of the therapeutic
implications of legal rules. 31" Because the law functions as a
therapeutic (or antitherapeutic) agent, a sensible policy analysis of
legal rules and procedures should include an assessment of the rule's
impact on therapeutic values. The need for such an assessment is
particularly, strong in an area such as the one dealt with in Riggins,
where the Court's suggested approach was expressed in dicta.
Because dicta can be either adhered to or discarded in future cases,
an analysis of the consequences of the Court's suggested approach
can be an important consideration in the Court's ultimate
determination of whether to follow that approach.
What are the therapeutic implications of the Supreme Court's
newly invigorated approach to the right to refuse treatment?
Although little empirical work has been done on the therapeutic
implications of the right to refuse treatment,31 9 principles of social
and cognitive psychology and of psychodynamic theory would predict
that patients generally respond more effectively to treatments that they
have chosen rather than ones imposed upon them coercively.2 ° The
317 Rennie, 458 U.S. at 1119.
311 See sources cited supra note 1.
319 See David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a New
Research Tool, in ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 310-11 (calling for empirical analysis of the
therapeutic consequences of the right to refuse treatment).
320 See SHARON BREHM & JACK W. BREHM, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE: A
THEORY OF FREEDOM AND CONTROL 301 (1981); John S. Carroll, Consent to Mental
Health Treatment: A Theoretical Analysis of Coercion, Freedom, and Control, 9
BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 129, 137-38 (1991); Winick, supra note 99, at 46-53; Winick,
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exercise of choice in favor of treatment, provided that it is truly
voluntary, sets up expectancies of positive outcomes that predictably
will increase patient motivation and treatment compliance, which in
turn enhances the chances that treatment will be successful. 21 Choice
sparks intrinsic motivation322 and commitment.3 23  The voluntary
acceptance of a treatment plan recommended by a therapist constitutes
the setting of a goal and an expression of the patient's belief that the
goal is achievable and that he or she will attempt to achieve it. This
"goal-setting effect" would be less likely to occur when the goal is
imposed on the patient coercively. 24 Indeed, imposing treatment
over objection may produce feelings of resentment and psychological
reactance that reduce patient compliance and make it less likely that
treatment will succeed. 25
In addition, according patients a right to refuse or accept
treatment can have the effect of restructuring the therapist-patient
relationship in ways that maximize its potential effectiveness as a
supra note 8, at 192-99; Winick, supra note 181, at 52-72; Bruce J. Winick, The Right
to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 17 INT'L J.
L. & PSYCHIATRY (forthcoming 1993).
321 ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND ACTION: A SOCIAL
COGNITIVE THEORY 338, 363, 368, 468, 478-80 (1986); BREHM & BREHM, supra note
320, at 301; DONALD MEICHENBAUM & DENNIS C. TURK, FACILITATING TREATMENT
ADHERENCE: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDEBOOK 156-57 (1987); Carroll, supra note 320,
at 129, 137-38; Winick, supra note 320.
322 See EDWARD L. DECI, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION 61-62 (1975); EDWARD L. DECI,
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 41 (1980); Edward L. Deci & Richard M.
Ryan, The Empirical Explanation of Intrinsic Motivational Processes, 13 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 39, 59 (1980).
323 BANDURA, supra note 321, at 368, 468, 478-80; BREHM & BREHM, supra note
320, at 319; CHARLES A. KIESLER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF COMMITMENT: EXPERIMENTS
LINKING BEHAVIOR TO BELIEF 164-67 (1971).
324 BANDURA, supra note 321, at 338, 363, 368, 468-80; Donald J. Campbell, The
Effects of Goal-Contingent Payment on the Performance of a Complex Task, 37
PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 23 (1984); Vandra L. Huber, Comparison of Monetary
Reinforcement and Goal Setting as Learning Incentives, 56 PSYCHOL. REP. 223 (1985);
Edward A. Locke et al., Goal Setting and Task Performance: 1969-1980, 90 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 125 (1981); James R. Terborg & Howard E. Miller, Motivation, Behavior, and
Performance: A Closer Examination of Goal Setting and Monetary Incentives, 63 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 29 (1978).
325 See JACK W. BREHM, A THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE (1966).
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therapeutic agent in its own right.326 This is particularly true for
psychotherapy, an area in which there is increasing recognition that
the therapist-patient relationship itself plays an essential role in
producing positive outcomes.327 A broader right to refuse treatment
can convert the therapeutic relationship into a real therapeutic alliance
in which patient trust and confidence in the therapist are increased,
as is patient participation in treatment decisionmaking. Increasing
patient trust and participation in decisionmaking can produce greater
patient internalization of treatment goals and enhance the potential for
attitudinal and behavioral change.
Although these positive therapeutic advantages of voluntary
as opposed to involuntary treatment seem most clearly applicable in
the case of verbal treatment approaches like psychotherapy 2 and
behavior therapy.329 Even organic treatment approaches like
2 See Winick, supra note 114, at 83-90; Winick, supra note 320.
327 BREHM & BREHM, supra note 320, at 151-55, 300-01; Robert F. Schopp & David
B. Wexler, Shooting Yourself in the Foot with Due Care: Psychotherapists and
Chrystallized Standards of Tort Liability, in ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 173; Deci & Ryan,
supra note 322, at 70.
32 See Council of the American Psychiatric Ass'n, Position Statement on the
Question of Adequacy of Treatment, 123 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY 1458, 1459 (1967) ("[lI]t
may be said in general that the effectiveness of the psychotherapies is proportional to the
degree of cooperation that is present."); Jay Katz, The Right to Treatment-An
Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. CH. L. REV. 755, 777 (1969) (stressing the need for
patient cooperation in psychotherapeutic treatment); Robert Michels, Ethical Issues of
Psychological and Psychotherapeutic Means of Behavior Control.: Is the Moral Contract
Being Observed?, 3 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 11, 11 (1973) (discussing limited
effectiveness of involuntarily imposed psychotherapy); Clifford D. Stromberg & Alan
A. Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 20 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 275, 328 (1983) (commenting on beneficial impact when patients participate in
treatment); Winick, supra note 114, at 83.
329 See EDWARD ERWIN, BEHAVIOR THERAPY: SCIENTIFIC, PHILOSOPHICAL AND
MORAL FOUNDATIONS 180-81 (1978) (rejecting the notion that behavioral techniques can
be used to mechanically control behavior because of necessity of patient involvement in
behavioral therapy); MEICHENBAUM & TURK, supra note 321, at 150; Albert Bandura,
Behavior Theory and the Models of Man, 29 AM. PSYCHOL. 859, 862 (1974) (rejecting
mechanistic view of behavior therapy and suggesting need for patient choice and
cooperation for effective treatment); Isaac M. Marks, The Current Status of Behavioral
Psychotherapy: Theory and Practice, 133 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 253, 255 (1976) (noting
need for patient cooperation in behavioral treatment); Winick, Legal Limitations, supra
note 9, at 360-61 (suggesting that patient involvement and cooperation in behavioral
therapy is essential to successful treatment); Winick, supra note 114, at 80 (noting the
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antipsychotic medication may be more effective when the patient
voluntarily agrees to accept such a course of treatment and
participates in the treatment decisionmaking process.3 ' Moreover,
in any treatment context, psychotropic medication should not be used
in isolation, but rather in combination with verbal and other
approaches. Although psychotropic medication may often be
necessary to allow the patient to deal with the severe symptoms of his
mental illness in order to make him accessible to other forms of
treatment, the likelihood of a proper response to and compliance with
a regimen of medication predictably will be increased in the long run
by according patients choice rather than by compelling such treatment
over objection.331 In any event, the success of verbal and other forms
of treatment used in conjunction with medication seems clearly
related to patient motivation and cooperation, both of which are
enhanced by providing choice.
The new direction that Riggins seems to suggest for the right
to refuse treatment accordingly may enhance therapeutic values.
Although the basis for this conclusion is grounded in psychological
and psychodynamic theory and clinical experience that has not yet
received empirical verification, the conclusion seems compelling, and
at least in the absence of empirical disproof, is entitled to a degree of
presumptive acceptance until needed empirical work can be done. 3 2
importance of patient cooperation in behavioral therapy).
o See Harper, 494 U.S. at 247 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The efficacy of
forced drugging is also marginal; involuntary patients have a poorer prognosis than
cooperating patients."); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978)
("mhe testimony has indicated that involuntary treatment [with psychotropic medication]
is much less effective than the same treatment voluntarily received."), aff'd in part,
modified in part, and remanded, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en bane), vacated and
remanded, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982); Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas G. Gutheil, Drug
Refusal: A Study of Psychiatric Inpatients, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 340, 341 (1980)
(noting correlation between patients' adherence to drug treatment and quality of the
doctor-patient relationship).
"I See MEICHENBAUM & TURK, supra note 321, at 156-57.
332 Professors John Monahan and Laurens Walker have discussed the way courts
should respond when deciding legal issues in areas involving what they call "empirical
questions without empirical answers." John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Empirical
Questions Without Empirical Answers, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 569 (1991). They suggest
that if empirical uncertainty exists as to propositions underlying a general rule of law,
rather than those relating merely to the resolution of a particular case, then courts may
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Therapeutic and constitutional considerations thus converge to
justify broader protection for the right to refuse treatment than the
Supreme Court, when it first considered the issue in Harper, was
prepared to provide. By limiting Harper's deferential approach to the
prison context and suggesting the need for more stringent scrutiny of
asserted justifications for invading the liberty interest in avoiding
unwanted administration of antipsychotic medication, Riggins seems
to be an important step in the right direction.
V. Conclusion
Riggins marks a turning point for the right to refuse mental
health treatment and an important development in the law governing
defendants found incompetent to stand trial. This Article has
examined the implications of Riggins for these two areas, analyzing
a number of significant open questions raised by the Court's opinion
and the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy.
Riggins suggests new standards for courts dealing with
defendants restored to competency but requiring continued
administration of psychotropic medication which they seek to
terminate for the period of their trial. The Court suggests the need
for a judicial hearing at which the prosecution would have the burden
of demonstrating that such medication is medically appropriate and
necessary to maintain the defendant's competency in light of other
less intrusive means for accomplishing this purpose. The Court left
open a number of important questions concerning the application of
this suggested standard, however. It also left unresolved questions
concerning the disposition of defendants who become incompetent as
a result of being permitted to discontinue their medication. In
addition, it left open similar questions concerning the disposition of
treat theoretical speculation, even if untested, as the equivalent of precedential authority,
which can form the basis for a legal rule. Id. at 570-71, 593. Under this view, courts
may rely on therapeutic jurisprudence speculation about what the results of empirical
research might demonstrate as the basis for resolving open legal questions in a way that
leaves such questions open to revision in light of future empirical research and has the
salutary effect of encouraging such research. Id. at 593. Because Riggins' broadening
of the right to refuse treatment is dicta, it satisfies this condition, and can therefore be
seen as a creative application of therapeutic jurisprudence.
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those who are not allowed to refuse their drugs, but who experience
side effects from the medication that alter their demeanor or ability
to participate at trial in ways that are predicted to be prejudicial.
This Article has analyzed these open questions, suggesting how they
should be resolved in light of existing constitutional doctrine and
therapeutic considerations.
Justice Kennedy's proposal of an additional "extraordinary
showing" to be required of prosecutors as a condition for forced
medication in this context was also analyzed and its adoption
commended as a useful device to avoid prejudice and minimize
unnecessary and inappropriate use of medication. A possible way out
of the dilemma raised for defendants whose medication is predicted
to produce likely trial prejudice, waiver of the due process right
recognized in Pate v. Robinson, was explored. Although Justice
Kennedy suggested that such waiver would be constitutionally
impermissible, the Article criticized this conclusion and suggests the
conditions under which such waiver should be allowed.
Riggins also raises significant implications for the developing
right to refuse treatment. The Article analyzed the impact of the
Court's new approach to these issues on the right to refuse in other
contexts. The Court's new approach differs sharply from the
deferential standard previously applied in Washington v. Harper,
which now seems to be limited to the prison context in which it
arose, and from the similarly deferential professional judgment
approach of Youngberg v. Romeo that some lower courts had applied
in the treatment refusal area. The Court's new and more expansive
approach to the right to refuse treatment is defended as consistent
with both constitutional and therapeutic values. The newly
invigorated right to refuse treatment, requiring an overriding
governmental interest that cannot be achieved through less intrusive
means, not only is more consonant with the nature of the liberty
interest invaded by involuntary intrusive treatment, but also with
fostering voluntary approaches to treatment, which may be more
effective than traditional coercive approaches used for those suffering
from mental illness. Although the Court's opinion did not consider
these therapeutic implications, the right to refuse treatment, by
permitting patients to make voluntary choices in favor of treatment,
and by effecting a restructuring of the therapist-patient relationship,
may actually advance the therapeutic interests of patients. By
[Vol. X
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expanding the right to refuse treatment, Riggins can thus be seen as
an application of therapeutic jurisprudence.

